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As indicated by recent multi-million dollar settlements between 
the federal government and several major pharmaceutical companies, 
the current federal healthcare system is improperly paying claims 
through Medicaid and Medicare for off-label use of prescription 
drugs. These widespread improper payments are due, at least in part, 
to an information gap in the current billing system for the recently 
expanded Medicare and Medicaid programs, which, if fixed, could 
reduce or eliminate improper payments for off-label prescriptions. 
The solution includes incorporating patient diagnosis information into 
the billing system for Medicare and Medicaid prescription drug bene-
fit programs, which would allow for real-time review of prescription 
drug claims for eligibility instead of the delayed audit currently used 
occurring weeks (or months and years) after payment has been made. 
In addition, linking diagnosis codes directly to prescription informa-
tion would provide more robust data to better inform comparative 
effectiveness research, drug safety monitoring, and insurance cover-
age decisions. Doing so, however, will likely eliminate one of the 
critical legal theories under the False Claims Act on which the fraud 
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enforcement community has relied upon for recouping billions of dol-
lars from pharmaceutical companies for their off-label promotion of 
drugs. Even so, maintaining the information gap in the current billing 
system, while potentially valuable as an enforcement mechanism, is 
short-sighted and unnecessarily risky for both fiscal stability and the 
overall public health. 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent settlement agreements between the federal government 
and major pharmaceutical companies, totaling over $2 billion recov-
ered,2
  
  2 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Allergan Agrees to Plead 
Guilty and Pay $600 Million to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Bo-
tox® (Sept. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Dep’t of Justice Allegran Press Release], available 
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/September/10-civ-988.html; Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Eli Lilly and Company Agrees to Pay $1.415 Billion to Resolve 
Allegations of Off-label Promotion of Zyprexa (Jan. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Dep’t of 
Justice Eli Lilly Press Relase], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
opa/pr/2009/January/09-civ-038.html; Settlement Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Pfizer Settlement (2009) [Pfizer Settlement Agreement], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/ (search “Pfizer Settlement”; then follow “Pfizer Settlement 
Agreement” hyperlink); Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Pays $2.3 Billion to Settle Marketing 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2009, at B4; see also AstraZeneca Third Quarter 2009 
Financial Results for Investors, available at http://www. astrazeneca.com/Investors/ 
Financial-results/2009- Financial-results (select the “Third quarter” tab and follow the 
“Figures” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 15, 2011) (providing information regarding the 
$520 million settlement with the DOJ to resolve a probe of its marketing practices for 
Seroquel).  
  Prior to 2009, the DOJ settled additional False Claims Act violations with 
Intermune for $36.9 million for the unlawful promotion of Actimmune, with Schering 
for $255 million for the off-label promotion of Temodar and Intron A, and with Sero-
no for $567 million for the unlawful promotion of Serostim. See Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Biopharmaceutical Firm Intermune to Pay U.S. over $ 36 Million for 
Illegal Promotion and Marketing of Drug Actimmune (Oct. 26, 2006), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/October/06_civ_728.html; Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Michael J. Sullivan, U.S. Attorney Dist. of Mass., Schering to Pay $ 
435 Million for the Improper Marketing of Drugs and Medicaid Fraud (Aug. 29, 
2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/ (search “Schering” & “Improper Market-
ing”; then follow “Press Release” hyperlink); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Serono to Pay $ 704 Million for the Illegal Marketing of AIDS Drug (Oct. 17, 2005), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2005/October/05_civ_545.html. 
 illustrate a significant problem in the current federal healthcare 
system: the improper payment of claims for outpatient prescription 
drugs that are ineligible for reimbursement due to off-label use. “Off-
label” describes the use of a drug for a disease or condition that is not 
included in the product labeling, which is specifically approved by the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), for an otherwise FDA-
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approved prescription drug.3 As explained in Section I.A, the problem 
is not the improper reimbursement of off-label prescriptions generally, 
but rather the improper payment of ineligible claims due to medically 
inappropriate off-label use. Off-label use of prescription drugs is per-
fectly legal and occasionally reflects the recognized standard of care 
for a disease or condition. The Medicare and Medicaid outpatient pre-
scription drug programs accommodate the legal off-label use of pre-
scription drugs and cover some, but certainly not all, off-label uses.4
The current billing systems for Medicare Part D and Medicaid, 
described in Section I.B, do not require pharmacists submitting claims 
for outpatient prescription drugs to provide any information regarding 
the use of the drug beyond the drug name and amount dispensed. By 
contrast, reimbursement of physician services and inpatient prescrip-
tion drugs under Medicare Parts A and B or Medicaid requires physi-
cians to submit diagnosis codes (also known as ICD codes).
 
Whether an outpatient prescription drug is eligible for reimbursement 
under Medicare or Medicaid largely depends on why the drug was 
prescribed. 
5
  
  3 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-96-212, PRESCRIPTION 
DRUGS: IMPLICATIONS OF DRUG LABELING AND OFF-LABEL USE 1-2 (1996) (providing 
background information about the off-label system). 
  4 The federal healthcare system includes insurance coverage under Medi-
care, Medicaid, the Federal Employee Health Benefit Program (insurance for federal 
government employees), CHAMPUS/TRICARE (insurance for active military per-
sonnel, civilian employees, and their families), and the Veterans’ Administration, as 
well as, some smaller insurance programs. While each program has its own legal and 
regulatory framework, Medicare and Medicaid comprise the vast majority of federal 
healthcare spending and enforcement efforts, which is why this article is limited to 
these programs. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ccc (2006) (Medicare); 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1396-1396v (2006) (Medicaid); 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8914 (2006) (Federal Employee 
Health Benefit Program). 
  5 “ICD” is the abbreviation for the International Classification of Diseases 
created by the World Health Organization. WORLD HEALTH ORG., INTERNATIONAL 
CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES AND HEALTH RELATED PROBLEMS (10th rev. 2d. 2004), 
available at http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
The ICD is currently in its tenth revision (ICD-10-CM), although it will not be fully 
implemented into federal healthcare billing until October 1, 2013. See Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, HHS Issues Final ICD-10 Code Sets and 
Updated Electronic Transaction Standards Rules (Jan. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/01/20090115f.html. Until that time, Medi-
care and Medicaid billing will use the diagnosis codes from the ninth revision (ICD-
9). See HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Modifications to Medical Data Code 
Set Standards To Adopt ICD-10-CM and ICD-10-PCS, 74 Fed. Reg. 3328-01 (Jan. 
16, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 162). 
 While 
the data collected for Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement allows 
the Government to audit outpatient prescription drug claims after 
payment to determine whether prescriptions were properly reim-
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bursed, it is unable to flag suspect claims before payment, resulting in 
millions—if not billions—of dollars lost in improperly paid claims. 
As explained in Section II.A, the staggering level of fraud and 
waste within the federal healthcare system has prompted Congress to 
devote significant financial resources to detect and recoup improper 
payments. As a result, there are thousands of federal and state em-
ployees and contractors charged with protecting the integrity of the 
federal health care system, by identifying ineligible claims through 
post-payment audits and pursuing the recoupment of improper pay-
ments. However, the information gap that facilitates the improper 
payment of claims in the first place also permits the federal govern-
ment to use private counsel to represent whistleblowers under the 
False Claims Act. This allows the Government to focus on pursuing 
large, publicly traded pharmaceutical companies instead of individual 
physicians and pharmacists as discussed in Section II.B. Section II.C 
argues that instead of devoting its resources to enforcement efforts, 
the Government should focus on fixing the gaps in the current billing 
system in order to prevent the payment of ineligible, false, or fraudu-
lent claims.  
In anticipation of the significant efforts to overhaul the current 
federal healthcare system in the coming months and years,6 this Ar-
ticle proposes a straightforward regulatory fix that could potentially 
prevent billions of dollars in health care fraud and waste due to inap-
propriate off-label promotion of prescription drugs by pharmaceutical 
companies. Specifically, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Ser-
vices (CMS) should require diagnosis codes on claims submitted for 
federal reimbursement of outpatient prescription drugs under the Med-
icare Part D and Medicaid programs, both of which were expanded 
under the most recent landmark health-overhaul legislation.7
  
   6 See Combating Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Hearing Before the H. 
Appropriations Subcomm. on Labor, Health & Human Servs., Educ., & Related 
Agencies, 111th Cong. 3 (2010) (statement of William Corr, Dep. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs.) [hereinafter Corr] (“We [the Department of Health & 
Human Services] need to take on the tough job of overhauling the claims processing 
system, and with the commitment of the President and the help of the Congress, we 
intend to do just that..”). 
  7 See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). 
 The ad-
vantages of extending the requirement of a diagnosis code to Medica-
id and Medicare Part D, as set out in Section III, are necessary to pro-
tect federal fiscal stability and patient safety, even if such a change 
would potentially eliminate one of the Government’s current fraud 
enforcement mechanisms. 
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I. THE PROBLEM WITH THE MEDICARE AND 
MEDICAID BILLING SYSTEMS 
The current billing systems for Medicare and Medicaid are woe-
fully inadequate for the prevention and detection of mistakes and 
fraud. Nearly half of the improper payments made by the federal gov-
ernment as a whole can be attributed to the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs.8 It makes sense then that significantly reducing improper 
payment of funds will reduce federal health care costs.9 For instance, 
outpatient prescription drug reimbursement was recently identified as 
a major cause for increased federal health care spending. Thus, reduc-
ing these improper payments should be a priority, especially in light 
of the recent expansion of both Medicare Part D and Medicaid.10
  
  8 “[The Department of Health and Human Services] reported improper 
payment estimates for Medicare and Medicaid totaling about $36 billion for fiscal 
year 2008….This represents about 50 percent of the total $72 billion in reported im-
proper payments.” U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-628T, IMPROPER 
PAYMENTS: PROGRESS MADE BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN IN ESTIMATING AND REDUCING 
IMPROPER PAYMENTS 10 (2009) [hereinafter IMPROPER PAYMENTS]. However, the 
2008 figure did not include an estimate for improper payments under Medicare Pre-
scription Drug Benefit (Part D) and only indicated the federal share. Id. at n.12. 
  9 “Speaking at the Center for Business Intelligence’s Annual Strategic 
Medicare Policy Summit in Washington, Bruce Steinwald, an independent consultant 
and former director of health care at the Government Accountability Office, said there 
are a number of solutions to address the [current unsustainable Medicare spending 
trends].” Medicare: Medicare Spending Unsustainable, Yet Can Still Be Controlled, 
Expert Says, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY REP., Feb. 16, 2010, at 1. Steinwald indicated 
that the “simplest solution…[was] to reduce waste, fraud, and abuse.” Id. See also 
Corr, supra note 6, at 7 (noting one estimate on prepayment edits and claims auditing 
indicates a 14-to-1 return on the investment to prevent health care fraud).  
 10 “While there are a number of reasons for the rise in health care costs over the past 
few decades, it is clear that prescription drugs are one of the main drivers of this 
increase.” Oversight Challenges in the Medicare Prescription Drug Program: Hear-
ing Before S. Subcomm. on Fed. Fin. Mgmt., Gov’t Info., Fed. Servs., & Int’l Sec., S. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of 
Sen. Thomas R. Carper) [hereinafter Carper]. The Office of Inspector General for the 
Department of Health and Human Services (OIG-HHS)—responsible for protecting 
HHS programs against fraud, waste, and abuse—identified oversight of the Medicare 
Part D prescription drug benefit as its top management and performance challenge for 
fiscal year 2007 due to the complex structure and the cost of the program. See U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2007 AGENCY FIN. REPORT, MGMT. 
ISSUE 1: OVERSIGHT OF MEDICARE PLAN D 2-3 (2007), available at http://www.oig. 
hhs.gov/publications/challenges/files/TM_Challenges07.pdf. More recently, the Gov-
ernment Accounting Office identified the Medicare Part D prescription drug benefit 
as a program that is at high risk for being susceptible for making improper payments. 
IMPROPER PAYMENTS, supra note 8, at 13. 
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A. Federal Reimbursement of Outpatient Prescription Drugs 
Currently, both Medicaid and Medicare offer outpatient prescrip-
tion drug coverage, but each covers separate patient populations and 
has different claims processing systems.11 Medicaid is a joint federal-
state program that finances medical services and outpatient prescrip-
tion drugs for qualifying low-income adults and children.12 “Medicaid 
programs are jointly funded by Federal and State governments but 
solely administered by States pursuant to Federal statutes, regulations, 
and policies.”13 Further, CMS is responsible for overseeing the admin-
istration of the state Medicaid programs to ensure that the “State-
submitted expenditures for Federal reimbursement are appropriate.”14 
In 2006, “Medicaid covered over 57 million beneficiaries at a cost of 
over $308 billion,” with the federal government contributing over 
$174 billion.15 In 2007, Medicaid spent approximately $15 billion on 
outpatient prescription drugs.16
Medicare is a program that provides health care assistance to el-
derly and disabled patients.
  
17 Parts A and B have historically reim-
bursed use of prescription drugs in hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, 
and outpatient dialysis and oncology clinics, but did not cover outpa-
tient prescription drugs.18
  
  11 While Medicare and Medicaid target separate and distinct patient popu-
lations, there is a pool of patients who are eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid. 
These patients are known as “dual eligible beneficiaries.” MEDICARE PAYMENT 
ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONG.: NEW APPROACHES IN MEDICARE 71-72 
(2004), available at http://www.medpac.gov/publications/congressional_reports/June 
04_ch3.pdf.  
  12 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-118R, MEDICAID 
OUTPATIENT PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: SECOND QUARTER 2008 FEDERAL UPPER LIMITS 
FOR REIMBURSEMENT COMPARED WITH AVERAGE RETAIL PHARMACY ACQUISITION 
COSTS 1 (2009) [hereinafter, MEDICAID OUTPATIENT PRESCRIPTION DRUGS]. “Medica-
id consists of 56 distinct programs created within broad federal guidelines and admi-
nistered by state Medicaid agencies. The 56 Medicaid programs include one for each 
of the 50 states; the District of Columbia; and the U.S. territories of American Samoa, 
Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.” Id. at n. 1. 
  13 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-04-07-00240, 
MEMORANDUM REPORT: MSIS DATA USEFULNESS FOR DETECTING FRAUD, WASTE, 
AND ABUSE 2 (2009) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM REPORT: MSIS DATA], available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-04-07-00240.pdf. 
  14 Id. 
 15 Id. (footnote omitted). 
  16 MEDICAID OUTPATIENT PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, supra note 12, at 1. 
  17 IMPROPER PAYMENTS, supra note 8, at 11 (“As HHS’s largest program, 
[Medicare] represented nearly $400 billion or almost 60 percent of HHS’s outlays for 
fiscal year 2008.”). 
 Federal reimbursement of most outpatient 
   18 Id. The Medicare Program is comprised of Parts A—D. The Medicare 
Fee-for-Service (FFS) represents the largest share of Medicare payments and includes 
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prescription drugs was limited to Medicaid claims prior to the Medi-
care Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003, which created Medicare Part D, an outpatient prescription drug 
benefit program that went into effect on January 1, 2006.19 In its first 
year, Part D provided federally subsidized prescription drug coverage 
to nearly 28 million beneficiaries at a cost of $47.4 billion, nearly 12 
percent of total Medicare spending.20 In 2007, the total spending for 
Part D rose to $54.4 billion.21 As of February 2010, 27.6 million bene-
ficiaries were enrolled in Part D plans.22
While both government attorneys and reporters have broadly 
stated that insurers do not reimburse prescriptions for off-label uses, 
the reimbursement framework is significantly more nuanced.
 
23 For 
purposes of Medicaid and Medicare Part D, a drug is eligible for 
reimbursement only if it is used for a “medically accepted indica-
tion.”24
  
Hospital Insurance (Medicare Part A) and Supplementary Medical Insurance (Medi-
care Part B). Medicare FFS “covers an array of items and services including hospital, 
skilled nursing and home health care; physician services; ambulance services; and 
medical equipment and supplies.” Id. Medicare Advantage (Medicare Part C) is de-
signed to provide private healthcare coverage for beneficiaries who choose this as an 
alternative to Medicare FFS. Id. For purposes of this Article, the only relevant part 
dealing with reimbursement of outpatient prescription drugs is the Medicare Prescrip-
tion Drug Benefit (Medicare Part D). 
  19 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-1074R, MEDICARE PART 
D PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE: FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF REPORTED PRICE 
CONCESSIONS DATA 1 (2008) [hereinafter MEDICARE PART D PRESCRIPTION DRUG 
COVERAGE] (citing Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 101, 117 Stat. 2066, 2071-2152). 
  20 Id. 
  21 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-529T, MEDICARE PART 
D: SPENDING, BENEFICIARY OUT-OF-POCKET COSTS, AND EFFORTS TO OBTAIN PRICE 
CONCESSIONS FOR CERTAIN HIGH-COST 6 (2010), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10529t.pdf. 
  22 Id. at 1. 
  23 See Kathleen M. Boozang & Simone Handler-Hutchinson, “Monitor-
ing” Corporate Corruption: DOJ’s Use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements in 
Health Care, 35 AM. J. L. & MED. 89, 98 (2009) (“Drug and device reimbursement 
regulations are some of the most complicated regulations that exist.”); see also Joshua 
Cohen, Andrew Wilson & Laura Faden, Off-Label Use Reimbursement, 64 FOOD 
DRUG L. J. 391, 394 (2009) (Payment for off-label use is “murkier” because “off-label 
uses are usually not included on plan formularies, though some drugs are placed on 
prior authorization schedules owing to their off-label use ‘potential.’ Second, there is 
no premarketing approval evidence on off-label use safety and efficacy, and post-
marketing evidence is often limited. This does not imply, however, that off-label uses 
are not reimbursed. They are usually reimbursed, albeit conditionally.”). 
 This includes any specific indication listed on the drug’s labe-
  24 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-8(k)(2) (West 2010) (defining “covered outpa-
tient drug” for Medicaid); 42 C.F.R. § 423.100 (2010) (defining Medicare “Part D 
drug” by referring to Medicaid statute definition of “medically accepted indication”); 
see also Cohen et al., supra note 23, at 393 (“Of particular concern to policymakers 
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ling, as approved by the FDA (also known as an “on-label” use), any 
use which is supported by peer-reviewed medical literature,25 or any 
use supported by one or more citations found in recognized drug 
compendia, including the American Hospital Formulary Service Drug 
Information, the United States Pharmacopeia-Drug Information (or its 
successor publications), and the DRUGDEX Information System.26 
The uses supported by peer-reviewed medical literature or compendia 
citations include, both on-label uses as well as, uses that are not in-
cluded on the FDA-approved labeling for a drug (“off-label” uses).27
The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) provides the legal 
framework for the development, approval, and marketing of prescrip-
tion drugs.
  
28 However, it does not control a physician’s prescribing 
habits or the practice of medicine.29 Further, while off-label promo-
tion of prescription drugs may be illegal under the FDCA, off-label 
use of prescription drugs is legal,30 widespread,31
  
(regulators and payers) is the lack of supporting data for numerous off-label uses. 
Evidently, 15 percent of all off-label uses lack scientific evidence of any kind, while 
fewer than 30 percent of off-label practices are supported by strong clinical evi-
dence.”). 
  25 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r–8(g)(1)(B)(ii) (West 2010).  
  26 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r–8(g)(1)(B)(i) (West 2010). 
  27 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(t)(2)(B) (West 2010). See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE BENEFIT POLICY MANUAL, PUB. NO. 100-02, ch. 15 
§50.4.2, https://www.cms.gov/manuals/Downloads/bp102c15.pdf (last visited Apr. 
15, 2011) (“An unlabeled use of a drug is a use that is not included as an indication on 
the drug’s label as approved by the FDA. FDA approved drugs used for indications 
other than what is indicated on the official label may be covered under Medicare if 
the carrier determines the use to be medically accepted, taking into consideration the 
major drug compendia, authoritative medical literature and/or accepted standards of 
medical practice.”); Cohen et al., supra note 23, at 392 (“Scientific findings that sup-
port off-label uses are first highlighted in medical professional meetings, drug com-
pendia, peer-reviewed literature, and the general media.”) (footnote omitted).  
  28 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399a (2006). 
  29 Gregory Gentry, Criminalizing Knowledge: The Perverse Implications 
of the Intended Use Regulations of Off-Label Promotion Prosecutions, 64 FOOD & 
DRUG L. J. 441, 444 (2009) (“Indeed, the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA) forbids the regulation of off-label use saying, ‘Nothing in this Act shall be 
construed to limit or interfere with the authority of a healthcare practitioner to pre-
scribe or administer any legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or 
disease within a legitimate healthcare practitioner-patient relationship.”) (citing 21 
U.S.C. §396). 
 and, in many cases, 
  30 See 21 U.S.C. §396 (explaining how the FDCA does not limit the prac-
tice of medicine); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY ON GOOD 
REPRINT PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND 
MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF 
APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES [hereinafter 
REPRINT PRACTICES], available at 
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm125126.htm (“Once a drug 
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considered the standard of care.32 Off-label use of prescription drugs 
“covers the range from experimental to standard therapy and even 
state-of-the-art treatment. In some instances, off-label use represents 
first-line treatment, in others second- and third-line therapy, and still 
others last resort therapy.”33
Once a product has been approved for marketing, a physician 
may prescribe it for uses or in treatment regimens or patient 
populations that are not included in the approved labeling. 
Such “unapproved” or, more precisely, “unlabeled” uses may 
be appropriate and rational in certain circumstances, and may, 
in fact, reflect approaches to drug therapy that have been ex-
  
The FDA has historically recognized the value of off-label use. 
For example, in 1982, FDA said: 
  
or medical device has been approved or cleared by FDA, generally, healthcare profes-
sionals may lawfully use or prescribe that product for uses or treatment regimens that 
are not included in the product’s approved labeling….” ) (last updated Jan. 2009); 
Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit of 
False Claims Regarding Off-Label Prescribing, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 69 
(2008) (noting that the FDCA does not limit the authority of medical practioner to 
prescribe off-label prescription drug use). 
  31 See Hua Chen et al., Off-Label Use of Antidepressant, Anticonvulsant, 
and Antipsychotic Medications Among Georgia Medicaid Enrollees in 2001, 67 J. 
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 972 (2006) (concluding off-label use of antidepressant and 
antipsychotic medications is highly prevalent among Georgia Medicaid beneficiaries); 
Johnson, supra note 30, at 61 (“Some estimates . . . indicate that over half of the 
prescription medications provided to patients in the United States may be prescribed 
for a purpose, in a higher or lower dose, over a longer period of time, or for a popula-
tion (such as children) different from that for which the drug has been approved.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
  32 See, e.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F.Supp.2d 51, 56-57 
(D.D.C. 1998) (describing the advantages and disadvantages of off-label use and 
acknowledging that it is part of the practice of medicine); see also REPRINT 
PRACTICES, supra note 30 (“These off-label uses or treatment regimens may be impor-
tant and may even constitute a medically recognized standard of care. Accordingly, 
the public health may be advanced by healthcare professionals’ receipt of medical 
journal articles and medical or scientific reference publications on unapproved new 
uses of approved or cleared medical products that are truthful and not misleading.”); 
Jeffrey L. Blumer, Off-Label Use of Drugs in Children, 104 PEDIATRICS 598, 600 
(1999) (“The prescribing of drugs for off-label use is entirely proper. The decision 
regarding how to use a drug must be made based on what is good medicine and what 
is best for the patient, regardless of conforming to labeling.”); Johnson, supra note 30, 
at 68 (“[O]ff-label use often becomes the customary standard of care in particular 
circumstances, with the result that doctors are at risk for malpractice liability for 
failure to prescribe an approved drug for an off-label use.”). 
  33 Cohen et al., supra note 23, at 392 (citing Thomas Laetz & George 
Silberman, Reimbursement Policies Constrain the Practice of Oncology, 266 JAMA 
2996, 2996-99 (1991)).  
10 JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET [Vol. 2:2  
tensively reported in medical literature….Valid new uses for 
drugs already on the market are often first discovered through 
serendipitous observations and therapeutic innovations….34
More recently, FDA has confirmed this position, recognizing that 
“the public health can be served when health care professionals re-
ceive truthful and non-misleading scientific and medical information 
on unapproved uses of approved or cleared medical products.”
 
35 This 
is especially true for diseases and patient populations in which clinical 
trials are particularly difficult because the specific disease is rare 
(making statistical significance in a clinical trial impossible),36 the 
costs of the clinical trials are unlikely to be recouped even if the drug 
is approved by the FDA,37 or the patient population is difficult to 
enroll and study.38
While doctors can prescribe drugs for off-label uses, the FDCA 
restricts how pharmaceutical companies promote their products. Many 
government attorneys discussing off-label promotion investigations 
broadly state that it is illegal for a drug company to promote their 
products for off-label uses.
 
39
  
  34 Use of Approved Drugs for Unlabeled Indications, 12 FDA DRUG BULL. 
4, 5 (1982). 
  35 REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 30. 
  36 See Cohen et al., supra note 23, at 394 (“Some off-label uses may even 
represent then only therapeutic option available to patients.”); Gentry, supra note 29, 
at 442 (“[R]are diseases may never have an on-label drug use. Most diseases afflicting 
fewer than 200,000 Americans are ‘totally without’ FDA-labeled treatment. Some ‘90 
percent of [patients] must rely on off-label uses’ to have any treatment at all.”) (citing 
Abbey S. Meyers, Pres., National Org. for Rare Diseases, Inc., Prepared Testimony 
before Subcomm. on Human Res. and Intergovernmental Relations of the House 
Comm. On Gov’t Reform and Oversight (Sept. 12, 1996)). 
  37 See Cohen et al., supra note 23, at 392 (“Many off-label uses may never 
get approved, even if supported scientifically, if the sponsor decides that the cost and 
risk of seeking a supplemental approval outweigh the economic benefit to the sponsor 
of obtaining the approval.”). 
  38 Two such patient populations are children and pregnant women. Gentry, 
supra note 29, at 441-42 (“It has been reported that 80 percent of all medications 
prescribed for children had FDA-required disclaimers about the use in children be-
cause of the paucity of pediatric research. Some patient populations may never have 
on-label drugs available to them. As one pharmaceutical executive asked, ‘Who in his 
right mind would work on a product that would be used by pregnant women?’”) 
(footnotes omitted).  
 However, “promotion,” off-label or oth-
  39 See, e.g., Enforcement of the Criminal Laws Against Medicare and 
Medicaid Fraud: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Sec. 
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 13 (2010) (statement of D. Mark 
Collins, Ass’t Att’y Gen., Dir., Neb. Medicaid Fraud Control Unit & Pres., Nat’l 
Ass’n of Medicaid Fraud Control Units) [hereinafter Collins], available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Collins100304.pdf (“[F]ederal law prohibits a 
manufacturer from promoting a drug for uses not approved by the FDA.”); Allega-
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erwise, is not defined in the FDCA.40 Instead, the FDCA prohibits off-
label promotion indirectly. For example, violations may be triggered 
through the introduction of an unapproved “new drug” or a “mi-
sbranded” drug into interstate commerce.41
Before selling a prescription drug in interstate commerce, phar-
maceutical companies are required to submit new drug applications 
(NDA) to the FDA for approval.
 
42
  
tions of Waste, Fraud and Abuse in Pharmaceutical Pricing: Financial Impacts on 
Federal Health Programs and the Federal Taxpayer: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 6 (2007) (statement of Lewis 
Morris, Chief Counsel, Office of Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Health and Human Servs.), 
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/testimony/docs/2007/020907tmy.pdf (“While physi-
cians may lawfully prescribe a drug for an off-label use, manufacturers are prohibited 
from promoting a drug for uses other than FDA-approved uses.”). 
  40 Indeed, the strongest authority the federal government could provide for 
a definition of “promotional labeling” in recent litigation was a draft “Guidance for 
Industry,” which provides non-binding recommendations for drug and device manu-
facturers. Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion 
to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment at 6, Allergan, Inc. v. United States (D.D.C. 
Jan. 11, 2010) (No. 09-cv-01879), 2010 WL 110193 (citation omitted). The draft 
guidance states that “[p]romotional labeling is generally any labeling other than the 
FDA-approved labeling,” and provides no statutory or regulatory authority for this 
definition. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: “HELP-SEEKING” AND 
OTHER DISEASE AWARENESS COMMUNICATIONS BY OR ON BEHALF OF DRUG AND 
DEVICE FIRMS (2004) [hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/G
uidances/UCM070068.pdf.  
  41 See e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 331(a)-(c) (Supp. 2010) (misbranding viola-
tions); 21 U.S.C. § 331(d) (2006) (violation for “introduction or delivery for introduc-
tion into interstate commerce of any article in violation” of 21 U.S.C. § 355, the “new 
drug” application process).  
  The misbranding and new drug violations deal with “advertising” and 
“labeling,” both terms linked more directly to the promotion of a drug. “Advertising,” 
while referenced extensively in the FDCA is not defined by the statute. “Labeling,” 
however, is defined in 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (2006) as “all labels and other written, 
printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or 
(2) accompanying such article.” Both terms are further clarified in the accompanying 
regulations. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(k)(l) (2010) (“Advertisements” include “adver-
tisements in published journals, magazines, other periodicals, and newspapers, and 
advertisements broadcast through media such as radio, television, and telephone 
communication systems.” Additionally, “labeling” includes “[b]rochures, booklets, 
mailing pieces, detailing pieces, file cards, bulletins, calendars, price lists, catalogs, 
house organs, letters, motion picture films, film strips, lantern slides, sound record-
ings, exhibits, literature, and reprints and similar pieces of printed, audio, or visual 
matter descriptive of a drug and references published (for example, the ‘Physicians 
Desk Reference) for use by medical practitioners, pharmacists, or nurses, containing 
drug information supplied by the manufacturer, packer, or distributor of the drug and 
which are disseminated by or on behalf of its manufacturer, packer, or distributor.”).  
  42 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (Supp. 2010) (new drug application requirements). 
 When the FDA reviews and ap-
proves an NDA, the approval is specific to the disease or condition 
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(identified as the “indication,” on the FDA-approved prescribing in-
formation) for which the manufacturer conducted the required pre-
market clinical trials.43 For purposes of the FDCA, previously ap-
proved prescription drugs may still be considered “new” if the manu-
facturer promotes the drug for an unapproved use.44 An approved drug 
is considered “misbranded” if “its labeling is false or misleading in 
any particular,” or potentially if it lacks “adequate directions for 
use.”45
  
  43 Id. at § 355(b)(1) (2006). 
  44 For the broader purposes of the FDCA, a “new drug” means a drug that 
“is not drug is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training 
and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective 
for use under the condition prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling 
thereof,” or a drug that “as a result of investigations to determine its safety and effec-
tiveness for use under such conditions, has become so recognized, but which has not, 
otherwise than in such investigations, been used to a material extent or for a material 
time under such conditions.” 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (2006). Promotion for an unap-
proved use for an otherwise approved drug may not render a drug “new” if the use has 
been extensively studied and recognized by treating physicians as the standard of 
care. What is not clear under the current law is whether a company’s mere knowledge 
of widespread off-label use is sufficient to render an approved drug “new.” See Gen-
try, supra note 29, at 443 n.13 (citing Jonathan S. Kahan, Extra-Label Use: An Open 
Secret, MED. DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY, Apr. 1990, at 47, 48-49 (“What are 
companies to do when they learn that, contrary to their wishes, their own device is 
being used for an extra-label indication? Companies may fear FDA regulatory sanc-
tions . . . if their device becomes widely used for extra-label purposes.”) (emphasis 
added)).  
  45 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2006) (false or misleading label); 21 U.S.C. § 
352(f) (2006) (directions for use). The FDCA and supporting regulations suggest that 
prescription drugs are technically exempt from needing “adequate directions for use.” 
See 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (2006) (exemptions from labeling and prescription require-
ments); 21 C.F.R. § 201.100 (2010) (labeling exemptions from adequate directions 
for use). Even so, federal prosecutors still include misbranding due to lack of ade-
quate directions for use in their summary of violations triggered by off-label promo-
tion. See Government’s Memorandum for Entry of Plea and Sentencing at 2 United 
States v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 2:08-cr-00598 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/civil/ocl/cases/Cases/Cephalon/Cephalon%20sentencing%20
memorandum.PDF.  
 Off-label promotion may include false or misleading informa-
  The need to clarify “adequate directions for use” regulations and policies 
for prescription drugs was at issue in Allergan, Inc. v. United States. See Complaint 
Allergan, Inc. v. United States, (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2009) (No. 09-cv-01879), 2009 WL 
3187592 (Allergan filed a complaint seeking a determination of whether a discussion 
of safety concerns associated with off-label use would violate FDCA, in part, because 
product would not have adequate directions for the off-label use). Cross-motions for 
summary judgment were recently pending until Allergan agreed to stay the proceed-
ings as part of their $600 million criminal and civil settlement for alleged off-label 
promotion of their product, Botox. See Dep’t of Justice Allegran Press Release, supra 
note 2; Press Release, Allergan, Inc., Allergan Resolves United States Government 
Investigation of Past Sales and Marketing Practices Relating to Certain Therapeutic 
Uses of BOTOX® (Sept. 1, 2010), available at http://agn.client.shareholder.com/rele 
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tion or uses for which the FDA-approved prescribing information 
does not provide adequate directions for the off-label use. 
Historically, the FDA has been involved with relatively little en-
forcement of off-label promotion.46 This reflects, in part, the FDA’s 
position that not all off-label promotion is illegal under the FDCA.47 
The FDA’s current guidance on the distribution of off-label informa-
tion allows pharmaceutical companies to distribute peer-reviewed 
medical journal reprints on off-label uses provided they are “distri-
buted separately from information that is promotional in nature.”48
  
asedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=503974 (“To resolve the criminal and civil investigation, 
Allergan was required by the Government to dismiss Allergan’s First Amendment 
lawsuit pending in Washington, D.C., in which Allergan sought a ruling that it could 
proactively share truthful scientific and medical information with the medical com-
munity to assist physicians in evaluating the risks and benefits if they choose to use 
BOTOX® off-label to treat certain forms of spasticity. Allergan is disappointed that 
the court was not afforded an opportunity to hear and rule on these important First 
Amendment issues, as Allergan believes that physicians, patients, manufacturers, 
payers, and ultimately the quality of evidence-based medicine itself would have bene-
fited from a ruling clarifying the law.”). 
  46 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-835, 
FDA’S OVERSIGHT OF THE PROMOTION OF DRUGS FOR OFF-LABEL USES (2008), avail-
able at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08835.pdf. See also Katherine A. Helm, 
Protecting Public Health from Outside the Physician’s Office: A Century of FDA 
Regulation from Drug Safety Labeling to Off-Label Drug Promotion, 18 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 117, 177 (2007) (noting the lack of FDA enforce-
ment of misbranding violations historically). 
  47 Originally, the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 
1997 (FDAMA) specified that types of off-label promotion were legal provided cer-
tain statutory and regulatory requirements were met. See 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa (re-
pealed 2006). Further, both the FDA and the federal government traditionally did not 
pursue the regulation of off-label use. See, e.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 
F.3d 331, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[N]either Congress nor the FDA has attempted to 
regulate the off-label use of drugs by doctors and consumers. A physician may pre-
scribe a legal drug to serve any purpose that he or she deems appropriate, regardless 
of whether the drug has been approved for that use by the FDA.”); Ralph F. Hall & 
Robert J. Berlin, When You Have a Hammer Everything Looks Like a Nail: Misappli-
cation of the False Claims Act to Off-Label Promotion, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 653, 
657 (2006) (discussing the FDA’s complex stance on the promotion of off-label use). 
However, the provisions of FDAMA sunsetted in 2006. Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 
401(e), 111 Stat. 2296, 2364 (1997). Currently, the FDA Guidance for Industry pro-
vides the FDA’s position on the distribution of off-label information. See REPRINT 
PRACTICES, supra note 30. To the extent that promotional activities may extend 
beyond “labeling” or “advertising,” the statute is silent on the propriety of the activi-
ties. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399a (2006). 
  48 REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 30. 
 
Therefore, while a sales representative may deliver a reprint to a doc-
tor, it “should not be physically attached to any promotional material 
the sales representative uses or delivers during the office visit and 
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should not be the subject of discussion between the sales representa-
tive and the physician during the sales visit.”49
As this language suggests, the line between permissible and im-
permissible off-label promotion may be crossed by something as sim-
ple as a misplaced staple or an errant sales representative comment.
 
50 
Further, there is also some question as to whether a sales representa-
tive’s discussion of safety concerns associated with known off-label 
uses could render an approved drug “new.”51
B. Current Difficulties in Identifying Ineligible Claims for Reim-
bursement Due to Off-Label Use 
  
Current systemic hurdles make both real-time detection and post-
payment identification of specific ineligible claims due to medically 
inappropriate off-label use difficult.52 Because the Medicare Part D 
and Medicaid billing systems do not currently require diagnosis codes 
on claims submitted for reimbursement of outpatient prescription 
drugs,53 it is impossible to identify false claims based on the submit-
ted claims information alone.54 In order to identify an ineligible claim 
due to off-label use, the Government must match a patient’s treatment 
history (based on claims submitted for the prescribing physician’s 
services) to a claim for reimbursement for an outpatient prescription 
drug, and show that the patient’s diagnosis is not a medically accepted 
indication for the particular drug.55
  
  49 Id. 
  50 See Cohen et al., supra note 23, at 401 (“There is a fine line, however, 
between informing and promoting or marketing.”).  
  51 See Complaint Allergan, Inc. v. United States, (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2009) 
(No. 09-cv-01879), 2009 WL 3187592) (Allergan sought a determination of whether 
the discussion of safety concerns associated with off-label use would violate FDCA). 
However, the complaint was dismissed as part of a plea agreement in a separate case. 
See also discussion, supra note 45. 
  52 Cohen et al., supra note 23, at 398 (“15 percent of respondents com-
mented that the difficulty of detecting off-label use prevented them from instituting 
‘effective’ off-label use policies, such as denials of coverage or reimbursement re-
strictions.”). 
  53 See MEDICARE PART D PRESCRIPTION DRUG CLAIM FORM, available at 
http://www.anthem.com/ca/member/f0/s0/t0/pw_a116572.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 
2011). 
  54 Cohen et al., supra note 23, at 394 (“That a different set of circums-
tances surrounds off-label reimbursement presupposes the payer’s ability to detect 
off-label uses, which is not necessarily the case. As most pharmaceuticals do not 
require prior authorization, it is hard to know whether they are being prescribed off-
label.”).  
 
  55 See United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, No. 96-11651-PBS, 
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754, *10-11 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2003) (“But the Relator has 
provided analysis linking patients’ treatment histories to Neurontin prescriptions that 
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Physicians submit claims to Medicare and Medicaid to receive 
payment for the services they provide to their federally-insured pa-
tients. In order to receive payment physicians must include informa-
tion specific to the level of service provided and an ICD-9-CM diag-
nosis code that allows the payor to evaluate whether the service pro-
vided was medically necessary and appropriate.56 By contrast, retail 
pharmacists are not required to provide such information when seek-
ing reimbursement from Medicare and Medicaid for outpatient pre-
scription drugs.57 When retail pharmacists receive outpatient prescrip-
tions from patients or physicians, the patients’ diagnoses are not typi-
cally provided on the prescription. Retail pharmacists only need a 
patient’s diagnosis for reimbursement purposes when the drug is cov-
ered under Medicare Part B.58 Otherwise, pharmacists are able to 
submit claims for reimbursement without any diagnosis information.59
  
generated reimbursement claims; Relator contends this analysis demonstrates that 
many reimbursement claims must have been for off-label, non-compendium indica-
tions, given the patients’ treatment histories. Parke-Davis has submitted expert testi-
mony contesting the reliability of comparing data from pharmacy claim forms with 
diagnosis data from patient medical-services claim forms. Relator’s expert evidence 
suffices to survive summary judgment.”); Cohen et al., supra note 23, at 394-5 
(“[P]ayer drug utilization reviews can link diagnosis with hospital-assigned ICD-9-
CM codes.”) (footnote omitted). Thus, this cross-referencing of data will only identify 
claims that are not eligible for reimbursement because of the off-label use of the drug, 
not claims “tainted” by violations of anti-kickback, self-referral, or misbranding sta-
tutes. 
  56 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross Blue-
shield, 472 F.3d 702, 708 fn.8 (10th Cir. 2006) (“ICD-9-CM codes refers to the Inter-
national Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification codes, a 
coding system used to describe the diagnosis or medical condition for which medical 
services are rendered when Medicare claims are submitted to Medicare carriers.”). 
  57 See MEDICAID OUTPATIENT PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, supra note 12. 
  58 See MEDICARE CLAIMS PROCESSING MANUAL, Chapter 7, Section 7 
(explaining exceptions to general Part B coverage rule, including self-administered 
oral versions of covered injectable cancer drugs, that self-administered drugs fur-
nished to outpatients for therapeutic purposes are not covered by Medicare unless 
those drugs must be put directly into an item of durable medical equipment or a pros-
thetic device), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/downloads/clm104c07. 
pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2011); Id. at Chapter 17, Section 80.1.3 (“A cancer diagnosis 
code must be reported when billing for [oral cancer drugs using] these HCPCS 
[Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System] codes. If there is no cancer diagno-
sis the claim is denied.”); MEDICARE BENEFIT POLICY MANUAL, Chapter 15, Section 
50, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/Manuals/downloads/bp102c15.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
  59 Parke-Davis, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754, at *10 (“Parke-Davis also 
raises a factual argument about why Relator cannot show a false claim: Parke-Davis 
points out that the Medicaid reimbursement claim forms for prescription drugs do not 
require the claimant to list the indication for which the drug is being prescribed.”). 
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Due to the current patchwork of contracted private insurers re-
sponsible for administering Medicare Parts A, B, D, and Medicaid, the 
claims submitted for a physician’s services are processed and paid by 
different entities60 than the claims submitted by retail pharmacists for 
reimbursement of outpatient prescription drugs.61 At best, for any 
individual patient these entities may be two parts of the same umbrella 
corporation.62 At worst, linking the data between claims for physician 
services and outpatient prescription drug reimbursement requires 
coordination between competing insurance companies.63
  
  60 Entities that administer Medicare Part A are called “intermediaries” and 
entities that administer Medicare Part B physician service benefits are called “carri-
ers.” In addition, carriers that deal with Part B reimbursement of durable medical 
equipment may be separate from those administering physician service benefits. See 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICES CLAIMS CONTRACT DIRECTORY (2010) [herei-
nafter CMS CONTRACT DIRECTORY], available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/ contrac-
tinggeneralinformation/downloads/02_icdirectory.pdf (indicating the number of com-
panies involved in Part A and Part B reimbursement). 
  61 The federal government does not directly administer the Medicare Part 
D prescription drug benefit. Part D sponsors—entities that enter into contracts with 
Medicare—administer the benefit and compete for beneficiary enrollment. Part D 
sponsors are typically private health plans or insurers. In addition to their Medicare 
business, Part D sponsors typically offer drug coverage in the private insurance mar-
ket. See MEDICARE PART D PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE, supra note 19. As a con-
dition of payment, all Part D sponsors must submit data and information necessary for 
CMS to carry out payment provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-115(c)(1)(C) & (d)(2) 
(2006); 42 C.F.R. § 423.322 (2010). Every time a beneficiary fills a prescription 
covered under Part D, plans must submit a summary record called the prescription 
drug event (PDE) record to CMS. The PDE record contains prescription drug cost and 
payment data that will enable CMS to make payment to plans and otherwise adminis-
ter the Part D benefit. In April 2006, CMS issued a guidance document on how CMS 
anticipated implement the statutory payment mechanisms by collecting a limited 
subset of data elements on 100 percent of prescription drug “claims” or events. U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG EVENT DATA GUIDANCE, INSTRUCTIONS: REQUIREMENTS FOR 
SUBMITTING PRESCRIPTION DRUG EVENT DATA, § i, Background, available at 
http://www. cms.hhs.gov/DrugCoverageClaimsData/Downloads/PDEGuidance.pdf 
(last updated Apr. 27, 2006). Payment of PDE claims does not require submission of 
diagnosis codes. Id. 
  62 For example, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama provide both 
Medicare Part A and Part B coverage for beneficiaries in Alabama. See CMS 
CONTRACT DIRECTORY, supra note 60, at 12.  
  63 Even with full cooperation between entities, 26 states are still submitting 
Medicaid data to CMS in hard copy format, not electronic. MEMORANDUM REPORT: 
MSIS DATA, supra note 13, at 2. 
 Either way, 
identification of ineligible claims due to medically inappropriate off-
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label prescriptions requires side-by-side evaluation of multiple decen-
tralized data sets maintained by private contractors.64
II. THE STATUS QUO 
 
The False Claims Act (FCA) is central to the current federal 
health care fraud enforcement efforts, but these efforts only provide 
short-sighted financial benefit and do not fix the underlying systemic 
problem.65
  
  64 See Oversight Challenges in the Medicare Prescription Drug Program: 
Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Fed. Fin. Mgmt., Gov’t Info., Fed. Servs., and 
Int’l Sec. of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 
4 (2010) (statement of Robert A. Vito, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Office of 
Inspector Gen., Reg’l Inspector Gen. for Evaluation and Inspections) [hereinafter 
Vito] (“One barrier to conducting data analysis was that CMS and its contractors 
lacked a centralized data repository that would enable proactive data monitoring.”). 
 The statute allows the federal government to mobilize 
thousands of non-governmental employees in its enforcement efforts 
through a very generous whistleblower provision. In addition, the 
information gap in the current billing system allows the federal gov-
ernment to consolidate its efforts to recoup mistaken payments for 
ineligible off-label claims by prosecuting pharmaceutical companies 
who promoted their products for off-label uses rather than the individ-
ual physicians or retail pharmacists who wrote and filled the prescrip-
tions. Even so, the government’s enforcement efforts under the FCA 
do not address the underlying problem of improper payments of in-
eligible Medicare and Medicaid claims for outpatient prescription 
drugs. 
  65 Combating Health Care Fraud: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Labor, Health & Human Servs., Educ. & Related Agencies of the H. Comm. Appropr-
iations, 111th Cong. 8 (2010) (statement of Gary Grindler, Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice) [hereinafter Grindler] (“The primary enforcement tool pos-
sessed by the Department of Justice to pursue civil remedies in health care fraud 
matters is the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733.”). In addition to the 
FCA, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 provided an incentive for many states to 
adopt statutes that allow parallel actions in the state court for Medicaid claims be-
cause of the joint federal-state funding and administration of the Medicaid program. 
Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 6031, 120 Stat. 4 (2006). The Deficit Reduction Act allows 
states to retain an extra 10 percent of recovered Medicaid funds, which otherwise 
would be returned to the federal government, if the state has a false claims statute “at 
least as effective as” the federal FCA. 42 U.S.C. § 1396h(b)(2) (2006). 
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A. The False Claims Act Provides Significant Financial Incentives for 
Governmental and Private Enforcement of Fraud 
Congress originally enacted the FCA as a Civil War-era statute to 
combat fraud on the government.66 The FCA imposes liability on any 
person who either “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a 
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval,”67 or any person 
who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false 
record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim” paid or ap-
proved by the Government.68 Each FCA violation carries a per-claim 
penalty of $5,000 to $10,000, plus treble damages.69 In 1986, Con-
gress added a whistleblower provision to the FCA that provides pri-
vate citizens, known as qui tam relators, the opportunity to bring a 
FCA action on behalf of the Government in exchange for 15-30% of 
any eventual verdict or settlement.70 Since the qui tam provision was 
added in 1986, relators involved in health care fraud cases (and pre-
sumably relators’ counsel) have received nearly $1.8 billion as a result 
of their FCA allegations.71
Qui tam complaints are filed in camera, under seal, and are not 
served on the defendant until a court orders service.
 
72 In addition to 
the complaint, the qui tam relator also provides the government with a 
“written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and informa-
tion” the relator possesses.73
  
  66 See Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696-98 (1863) (The original 
False Claims Act was passed in 1863 and included both criminal and civil penalties.); 
Rev. Stat. §§ 3490-94, 5438 (1875) (separately codifying the criminal and civil penal-
ties). Currently, the civil provisions are located at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006) and 
the criminal provisions are now found, for the most part, at 18 U.S.C. §§ 286, 287, 
1001, 1002 (2006). See also Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 
44-45 (2002). 
  67 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1) (West 2010). 
  68 Id. § 3729(a)(2). 
  69 Id. § 3729(a). 
  70 Id. § 3730; see also Collins, supra note 39, at 12 (“In addition, twenty-
five states currently have state false claims statutes with qui tam provisions, and an 
increasing number of relators are filing their cases with the states as well as the feder-
al government. This development has fostered a significant increase in state/federal 
investigative partnerships.”). 
  71 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD STATISTICS – HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., CIVIL DIVISION, OCT. 1, 1987 – SEPT. 30, 2009, 2 (2010), http://www.justice. 
gov/civil/ frauds/fcastats.pdf. 
  72 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). 
  73 Id. § 3730(b)(2). 
 Based upon the information in the com-
plaint and written disclosure (and subsequent investigation of the rela-
tor’s allegations), the government may elect to intervene and take over 
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prosecution of the case or decline to intervene.74 If the government 
chooses to formally intervene, it notifies the court, which in turn or-
ders the complaint to be unsealed and served on the defendant.75
If the government declines to intervene, the complaint is unsealed 
and the relator is still able to prosecute the case on behalf of the gov-
ernment, but without the aid of the government’s considerable re-
sources.
 
76
  
  74 Id. §§ 3730(b)(2), 3730(c). 
  75 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FALSE CLAIMS ACT CASES: GOVERNMENT 
INTERVENTION IN QUI TAM (WHISTLEBLOWER) SUITS, http://www.justice.gov/usao/ 
pae/Documents/fcaprocess2.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). According to the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, “[t]here are no statistics 
reported on the length of time the average qui tam case remains under seal. In [that] 
District, most intervened or settled cases are under seal for at least two years (with, of 
course, periodic reports to the supervising judge concerning the progress of the case, 
and the justification of the need for additional time).” Id. 
  76 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2006). See also Pamela H. Bucy, Private 
Justice and the Constitution, 69 TENN. L. REV. 939, 944-45 & n.35 (2002) (“Histori-
cally, relators who proceed on their own after the DOJ has declined to intervene [as a 
plaintiff] have enjoyed little success. Their cases are dismissed more often and their 
recoveries are substantially less. For example, the aggregate amount paid to relators 
from … October 1, 1986 through … September 30, 2000, as the relators’ statutory 
share when the government intervened was $576 million. The aggregate amount to 
relators during this same time period when the government did not intervene was 
$35.3 million. Also, only 2.1% (12 out of 570) of qui tam FCA cases in which the 
government has intervened have been dismissed, whereas 71.1% (1357 out of 1907) 
of qui tam FCA cases in which the government has not intervened have been dis-
missed.”) (citing letter from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice to Pamela H. Bucy, FOIA Re-
quest 145-FOI-6072 (Oct. 20, 2001) (on file with Tennessee Law Review)). “The 
litigational advantages to private plaintiffs of obtaining DOJ intervention are so sub-
stantial that the acknowledged goal of any experienced relators’ attorney is to obtain 
the government’s intervention. As one experienced relator’s counsel explained: 
‘When evaluating a case and during the beginning stages of representing a whistle 
blower never forget your initial mission: persuade the government to pursue the 
case.’” Pamela H. Bucy, Moral Messengers: Delegating Prosecutorial Power, 59 
SMU L. REV. 321, 328 n.42 (2006) (citing Mitchell Kreindler, So You Wanna Be a 
Whistleblower’s Lawyer?, Address before the ABA National Institute, THE CIVIL 
FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND QUI TAM ENFORCEMENT 5 (Nov. 28, 2001)). 
  A large part of the reason why relators seek U.S. Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) intervention is the resources that the DOJ can bring to a case. One such 
resource is the work that DOJ attorneys and agents perform with the relevant agency 
to obtain government records pertaining to the alleged false claims. For example, in 
the healthcare field, DOJ and HHS attorneys and agents work with private insurers 
who contract with the Government to service Medicare and Medicaid claims, thereby 
obtaining billing data, longitudinal comparisons, and other helpful interpretations of 
billing regulations and history that would be available to private parties only through 
subpoenas or Freedom of Information Act requests, if at all. See generally ROBERT 
FABRIKANT, PAUL E. KALB, MARK D. HOPSON & PAMELA H. BUCY, HEALTH CARE 
FRAUD, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ch. 6 (2001) (discussing the investigation of 
healthcare fraud cases).  
 Qui tam relators, often current or former employees of de-
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fendant pharmaceutical companies, have been especially prominent in 
the development and pursuit of the current legal theory supporting 
enforcement of off-label promotion through the FCA.77 Indeed, the 
landmark case establishing potential FCA liability for off-label pro-
motion was filed and principally litigated by a relator alleging off-
label promotion of the prescription drug, Neurontin.78
  
  In addition, the DOJ is authorized by the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) to issue subpoenas “[i]n any investigation of—(i)(I) a 
Federal health care offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (2006). HIPAA subpoenas may re-
quire the production of tangible things but not oral testimony. The FCA authorizes the 
DOJ to seek civil investigative demands (“CID”), which are standard civil investiga-
tive tools (interrogatories, documents subpoenas, and depositions) before a suit is 
filed. 31 U.S.C. § 3733 (2006). Moreover, most federal agencies have authority to 
issue “Inspector General Subpoenas” to investigate, among other things, fraud by 
government contractors upon that agency. 5 U.S.C. app. § 6(a) (2006). These subpoe-
nas are quite versatile because they are not subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure (thus no showing of relevance is required) nor to the secrecy requirements of 
the grand jury. See, e.g., FTC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 567 F.2d 96, 104-05 & n.19 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977). 
  
  Also, in instances where it appears that criminal violations may have oc-
curred, the DOJ can commence a criminal investigation and employ investigative 
tools, such as grants of immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (2006) and the grand jury, 
which has broad topical and jurisdictional reach. See United States v. R. Enter., Inc., 
498 U.S. 292, 297-98 (1991) (explaining the importance and duties of a grand jury). 
Upon a “strong showing of particularized need for grand jury materials,” information 
gathered during a criminal grand jury investigation may be disclosed to government 
attorneys and their assistants who are investigating FCA violations. See United States 
v. Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. 418, 443 (1983). 
  77 For example, in January 2009, Eli Lilly resolved four qui tam actions as 
part of a settlement for alleged off-label promotion of Zyprexa, including: United 
States ex rel . Rudolf v. Eli Lilly and Co,. Civ. Action No. 03-943 (E.D. Pa.); United 
States ex rel . Faltaous v. Eli Lilly and Co., Civ. Action No. 06-2909 (E.D. Pa); Unit-
ed States ex rel . Woodward v. Jerusalem, Civ. Action No. 06-5526 (E.D. Pa.); and 
United States ex rel . Vicente v. Eli Lilly and Co., Civ. Action No. 07-1791 (E.D. 
Pa.). The four relators received nearly $78.9 million from the federal share of the 
settlement amount. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice Eli Lilly Press Release, supra note 2, at 
3.  
  Similarly, the government’s FCA allegations against Forest Laboratories 
for off-label promotion of Celexa and Lexapro were qui tam cases that settled in 2010 
for an undisclosed amount. See United States ex rel . Gobble v. Forest Labs. Inc., 729 
F. Supp. 2d 446, 448 (D. Mass. 2010); In re Celexa and Lexapro Mktg. and Sales 
Litig., No. MDL 09-02067-NM, 2010 WL 4644429 (D. Mass. Nov. 10, 2010).  
  78 The government declined to intervene in this FCA action alleging off-
label promotion of prescription drugs manufactured by Parke-Davis, Neurontin and 
Accupril, and kickbacks to prescribing physicians. See United States ex rel. Franklin 
v. Parke-Davis (Parke-Davis I), 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 46 (D. Mass. 2001). The relator, 
David Franklin, Ph.D., was a former Parke-David employee who pursued the case 
without the government’s assistance after the complaint was unsealed. United States 
ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis (Parke-Davis II), No. Civ.A. 96-11651-PBS, 2003 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754, at *20 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2003) (“But while the Govern-
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B. The Information Gap Allows False Claims Act Prosecution of 
Pharmaceutical Companies for Off-Label Promotion 
As explained above in Section I.B, the gap between a physician’s 
diagnosis of a patient and a pharmacist’s submission of a claim for 
federal reimbursement of an outpatient prescription drug facilitates the 
widespread improper payment of ineligible claims. This gap also faci-
litates the government’s use of the FCA to recoup these wrongful 
payments from pharmaceutical companies, rather than the physician 
who wrote the prescription or the pharmacists who actually submitted 
the claims.  
In settlement agreements with pharmaceutical companies, the 
government has alleged that the pharmaceutical companies’ off-label 
promotion of their prescription drugs caused the submission of false 
claims for payment in violation of the False Claims Act.79 While at 
first glance this broad-sweeping statement may seem relatively 
straightforward, the causal chain between a pharmaceutical company 
and a false claim for payment of its product must include a prescribing 
physician, a federally-insured patient, and the pharmacist who fills the 
prescription and submits the claim for reimbursement (see Figure 1, 
below).80 A FCA violation based upon off-label promotion of a pre-
scription drug does not arise from the pharmaceutical companies’ 
unlawful marketing activity itself,81
  
ment’s brief was persuasive on several points, the Government is (still) not a party to 
this suit, and the Court declines to use the Government’s brief to revive Relator’s 
claim.”).  
  79 See, e.g., Pfizer Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 3 (summarizing 
allegations by the United States against Pfizer).  
  80 See generally Hall & Berlin, supra note 47, at 658 (“Adding to the com-
plexity for manufacturers is that they generally do not know whether a specific patient 
is receiving an off-label product. They also generally do not know whether that pa-
tient is a private pay or public pay patient, or the substance of any particular reim-
bursement claim. However, the manufacturer may well know, from any number of 
sources, that the product is being used off-label by some number of patients even if 
the manufacturer could not identify the specific patients or their claims.”).  
 but rather from the submission of 
  81 Illegal off-label promotion may be criminally prosecuted under the 
FDCA and the government can seek equitable disgorgement. See 21 U.S.C. § 332(a) 
(2006) (“The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of the 
Territories shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown[,] to restrain [certain] violations of 
the [FDCA, including new drug and misbranding violations].”); United States v. Rx 
Depot, Inc., 438 F.3d 1052, 1058 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Section 332(a) of the FDCA 
invokes the equity jurisdiction of courts using the same statutory language the Su-
preme Court construed in Mitchell to authorize all traditional equitable remedies. 
Disgorgement is a traditional equitable remedy. Moreover, because the present action 
was brought by the government to protect the public health and safety, courts’ equita-
ble jurisdiction under the statute ‘assume[s] an even broader and more flexible cha-
racter.’ Thus, disgorgement is available under the FDCA unless (1) there is a clear 
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a claim that is ineligible for reimbursement under the federal health 
care system.82
 
Figure 1. Actors in the chain of causation for submission of false claim due to off-
label promotion. 
 
  
Theoretically, a pharmaceutical company’s statements about med-
ically inappropriate off-label uses, whether false or truthful, are made 
“knowingly,”83 and “ineluctably result in false Medicaid claims.”84
  
legislative command or necessary and inescapable inference prohibiting disgorgement 
or (2) disgorgement is inconsistent with the purposes of the FDCA.”) (quoting Porter 
v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) (other citations omitted); Vicki W. 
Girard, Punishing Pharmaceutical Companies for Unlawful Promotion of Approved 
Drugs: Why the False Claims Act is the Wrong Rx, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 
119, 156 (2009) (“In lieu of the DOJ’s current approach to unlawful promotion by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, such activity should be prosecuted solely under the 
FD&C Act, which is the statutory scheme established by Congress. Any DOJ con-
cerns that the remedies available under the False Claims Act are uniquely suited to 
motivate companies to comply with FD&C Act promotional restrictions are mis-
placed. Combining the penalty provisions in the FD&C Act with the doctrine of 
equitable disgorgement is sufficient to punish promotional activities that violate the 
FD&C Act and provide a preferable long-term approach to the continued use of the 
legally questionable theory of causation asserted by the DOJ in claims prosecuted 
under the False Claims Act.”). 
  82 See, e.g., Parke-Davis I, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 52 (“Thus, the alleged FCA 
violation arises—not from unlawful off-label marketing activity itself—but from the 
submission of Medicaid claims for uncovered off-label uses induced by Defendant’s 
fraudulent conduct.”).  
  83 Under the FCA, “‘knowingly” and “knowing” “mean that a person, with 
respect to information—(i) has actual knowledge of the information; (ii) acts in deli-
berate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (iii) acts in reckless 
disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.” See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(1) 
(West 2010). It requires “no proof of specific intent to defraud.” Id. Pharmaceutical 
companies closely track the reimbursement status of their products under federal and 
state health insurance programs, making it very likely that any statements generated 
from company information about an off-label use that is not eligible for reimburse-
ment were indeed made “knowingly.” 
  84 United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis (Parke-Davis II), No. 
Civ.A. 96-11651-PBS, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754, at *14 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 
2003) (“While it is now clear that Relator’s theory of the case is not limited to a 
‘scheme of fraud,’ the Court holds that Relator has presented evidence showing that it 
was foreseeable that Parke-Davis’s conduct (including non-fraudulent promotion of 
off-label Neurontin uses) would ineluctably result in false Medicaid claims.”).  
 
This assumes that a physician would not write a prescription for an 
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off-label use that is not eligible for federal reimbursement but for a 
drug company’s off-label promotion of that product.85 Setting aside 
the question of actual causation between the alleged off-label promo-
tion and the filing of a false claim (a factual question that allowed the 
Neurontin litigation to survive summary judgment),86
  
  85 See Girard, supra note 81, at 140-141 (“[T]he use of the False Claims 
Act against unlawful drug promotion is premised on the DOJ’s assumption that the 
drug company’s unlawful marketing is the but for cause of the physician’s decision to 
prescribe the drug and request federal health care program reimbursement.”) (footnote 
omitted).  
  86 See Parke-Davis II, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754, at *12-13 (“Whether 
Parke-Davis’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the presentation of false 
Medicaid claims is a question of fact. Relator has produced enough evidence on this 
score to create at least a genuine issue of material fact.”).  
  In terms of actual causation, the circulation of peer-reviewed medical 
journal articles, recognized by the FDA as truthful and not misleading, may have very 
little impact on prescribing habits. For example, in considering physician decision-
making, there is a “universal skepticism” among practicing physicians regarding the 
usefulness of the scientific literature. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 75. Moreover, 
this notion comes from the idea that “doctors ‘have a deep skepticism about clinical 
trials, from a belief that clinical experience, rather than the scientific evidence should 
govern clinical practice.’” Id. at 74 (quoting Rebecca K. Schwartz et al., Physician 
Motivations for Nonscientific Drug Prescribing, 28 SOC. SCI. & MED. 577, 581 
(1989)). This “[h]igh valuation of experience over studies” translates into a notion 
that some “doctors do not regard FDA approval as a necessary indicator of effective-
ness (e.g., when they prescribe for an unapproved use) and perhaps even safety (e.g., 
when they prescribe at unapproved dosages or durations or for significantly distinct 
populations on which the drug has not been tested).” Id. at 73, 74. Similarly, standard 
continuing medical education (CME) and promotional speaker programs use a stan-
dard lecture format, which has shown minimal impact on improving clinical care. See 
id. at 77-8.  
  Ultimately, using the False Claims Act for “unlawful promotion cases 
raises significant legal questions. The DOJ’s position that unlawful promotional activ-
ity by pharmaceutical companies ‘induces’ physicians to write prescriptions, resulting 
in the filing of false claims for reimbursement relies on a questionable theory of cau-
sation. Given that the penalty provisions in the FD&C Act, in conjunction with the 
doctrine of equitable disgorgement, provide sufficient means to punish unlawful 
promotional activity, reliance on the questionable theory of causation required to 
prosecute cases under the False Claims Act is unnecessary. Instead of using the False 
Claims Act, the DOJ should address unlawful promotional activity solely under the 
FD&C Act, which is the statutory scheme established by Congress specifically for 
that purpose and provides adequate remedies and punishment.” Girard, supra note 81, 
at 129 (citations omitted). 
 the information 
gap prevents either the prescribing physician or the submitting phar-
macist, both state-licensed professionals capable of exercising profes-
sional judgment, from being considered an independent actor suffi-
cient to break the causal chain between the pharmaceutical company’s 
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illegal off-label promotion and the submission of a false claim.87 As a 
result, the government can consolidate its efforts to recoup funds from 
pharmaceutical companies, with their relatively deep pockets and cor-
porate stability, instead of seeking recoupment from the more numer-
ous prescribing physicians and retail pharmacists.88
To be clear, though, these claims are not necessarily “false” or 
“fraudulent” in the traditional sense in that all the information pro-
vided on the claim is accurate. The false claims related to off-label 
 
  
  87 See, e.g., Parke-Davis I, 147 F.Supp.2d at 52-53 (“Defendant argues 
that Relator has not stated a claim because he has not accounted for the independent 
actions of the physicians who wrote the off-label prescriptions and the pharmacists 
who accepted and filled the off-label prescriptions. In other words, Defendant argues 
that—as a matter of law—Relator’s allegations cannot establish the causation re-
quirement of the FCA because the actions of these professionals were an intervening 
force that breaks the chain of legal causation. Under black letter law, however, such 
an intervening force only breaks the causal connection when it is unforeseeable. In 
this case, when all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the Relator, the partic-
ipation of doctors and pharmacists in the submission of false Medicaid claims was not 
only foreseeable, it was an intended consequence of the alleged scheme of fraud.”) 
(citations omitted).  
  Mistaken payment of ineligible claims due to off-label promotion becomes 
significantly less foreseeable where retail pharmacists are able to review a prescrip-
tion in light of a patient diagnosis and an automated billing system can easily flag 
ineligible claims due to off-label use. See, e.g., Parke-Davis II, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15754, at *9 (“If the Medicaid statute gives states the discretion to cover off-
label, non-compendium prescriptions, and a state exercised its discretion to cover 
such prescriptions, then an off-label Neurontin prescription in that state would not be 
a false claim. On the other hand, if the Medicaid statute does not give states the dis-
cretion to cover off-label, non-compendium prescriptions, but a state misconstrued 
the statute and authorized coverage of such prescriptions, an FCA action against 
Parke-Davis in that state would likely fail, as it would be difficult to establish Parke-
Davis’s scienter.”) (emphasis added). 
  88 The corporate stability of publicly-traded pharmaceutical companies is 
incredibly important for purposes of recouping funds. Smaller, closely held corpora-
tions are often used as shell companies in health care fraud schemes and recoupment 
of improper payments is particularly difficult once the funds received from CMS have 
left the shell company. See Waste, Fraud and Abuse: A Continuing Threat to Medi-
care and Medicaid: Hearing before H. Subcomm. on Labor, Health & Human Servs., 
Educ., & Related Agencies of H. Comm. of Appropriations, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) 
(statement of Omar Perez, Special Agent, OIG, Dep’t Health & Human Servs.) [he-
reinafter Perez] (“Once CMS paid the claims and deposited money into the compa-
ny’s bank account, it was withdrawn within days using multiple check cashers. The 
idea was to deplete the account so that once Medicare discovered the fraudulent bill-
ing, which could take 6 months to 1 year, there would be no money in the account.” 
These fraud schemes “were executed within a matter of months. After billing Medi-
care for millions of dollars, companies would change ownership, bill Medicare again 
for millions of dollars, close and simply take over another company and repeat the 
process in another location. By the time traditional investigative referral methods 
came to fruition, criminals had absconded with millions of tax payer dollars.”). 
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promotion of prescription drugs are predominantly claims that are not 
eligible for federal reimbursement because the prescribed drug is be-
ing used for a disease or condition that is not considered a medically 
appropriate indication.89 The falsity of these claims arises out of the 
specific disease or condition that the doctor is trying to treat with the 
prescription and whether the prescribed use is covered under Medi-
care or Medicaid.90
More often than not, qui tam relators have first-hand, insider 
knowledge of the defendant companies’ sales and marketing practices 
and allege company communications with doctors about off-label use 
of prescription drugs in violation of the FDCA. The relators are often 
limited, however, in their first-hand knowledge of any specific pre-
scriptions or claims for reimbursement and often assume that off-label 
promotion has caused the submission of false claims. Even so, if 
reimbursement claims for off-label prescriptions are considered false, 
and they have been caused by the pharmaceutical companies’ sales 
and marketing efforts, then each off-label prescription submitted for 
federal reimbursement exposes the companies to a penalty of $5,000 
to $10,000 per claim and the threat of treble damages.
  
91
  
  89 See, e.g., Parke-Davis I, 147 F.Supp.2d at 53 (specifically noting that 
the fact that the prescrptions at issue were for off-label use was material to whether a 
false claim was submitted to the government). 
  90 In the Neurontin litigation, Parke-Davis did not “dispute that an off-
label prescription submitted for reimbursement by Medicaid is a false claim within 
the meaning of the FCA.” Parke-Davis I, 147 F.Supp.2d at 51. However, it is unlikely 
that a similar assertion (i.e., that an ineligible off-label prescription submitted for 
reimbursement by Medicare Part D is a false claim) would be conceded because un-
like Medicaid, Medicare is not inherently a “payer of last resort.” See Ark. Dep’t 
Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 291 (2006). This scheme “means 
that all other available resources must be used before Medicaid pays for the medical 
care of an individual enrolled in a Medicaid program.” Caremark, Inc. v. Goetz, 480 
F.3d 779, 783 (6th Cir. 2007).  
  While both Medicare and Medicaid provide coverage for outpatient pre-
scription drugs, when both programs offer coverage, federal law requires that Medi-
care, not Medicaid, must bear the cost. See Conn. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Leavitt, 428 
F.3d 138, 141-142 (2d Cir. 2005) (recognizing that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25) requires 
Medicaid to offer coverage when both programs apply). However, there are situations 
when Medicare does not cover a particular off-label use that is covered under Medica-
id. Thus, health care providers may knowingly submit ineligible (and, per the DOJ’s 
legal theory, “false”) claims for off-label use when a patient carries both Medicare 
Part D and Medicaid coverage and proper coverage under Medicaid requires a denial 
letter from Medicare.  
  
  91 See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N 
5266, 5274 (“Each separate bill, voucher or other ‘false payment demand’ constitutes 
a separate claim for which a forfeiture shall be imposed, and this is true although 
many such claims may be submitted to the Government at one time. For example, a 
doctor who completes separate Medicare claims for each patient treated will be liable 
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In addition to the financial penalties, a defendant faces potential 
exclusion from Medicare and Medicaid.92 “Exclusion” in the context 
of a health care fraud investigation, including a FCA action for off-
label promotion, means that the defendant company is no longer able 
to participate in the federal health care system—no payment will be 
made by any federal health care program for any items or services 
furnished, ordered, or prescribed by an excluded individual or entity.93 
Because “the federal government is the single largest payor of health 
care services [in the United States], exclusion, known as the ‘death 
penalty’ to health care providers, is the most feared result of [FCA] 
prosecutions.”94
  
for a forfeiture for each [form]…even though several such forms may be submitted to 
the fiscal intermediary at one time.”) (citation omitted); see also United States ex rel. 
Tyson v. Amerigroup Ill., Inc., 488 F.Supp.2d 719, 740-742 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (discuss-
ing each separate claim form and the corresponding liability); Michael Rich, Prosecu-
torial Indiscretion: Encouraging the Department of Justice to Rein in Out-of-Control 
Qui Tam Litigation Under the Civil False Claims Act, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1248 
(2008) (“[P]otential recoveries and settlements can spiral quickly into tens or hun-
dreds of millions of dollars, surpassing or even dwarfing the damages award.”).  
  92 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a) (2006) (mandatory exclusion); 42 U.S.C. § 
1320a-7(b)(7) (2006) (permissive exclusion for fraud and kickbacks). However, the 
future application of these penalties is somewhat in question because of the new 
health care legislation. See The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub.L. 
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by the Health Care and Education Re-
conciliation Act of 2010, Pub.L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). The constitutio-
nality of the new health care legislation is currently in dispute. Compare Florida ex 
rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 
WL 285683, at *40 (N.D.Fla. Jan. 30, 2011) (holding “individual mandate” unconsti-
tutional and all amended provisions of the existing health care laws unconstitutional 
as not severable), with Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F.Supp.2d 882, 893-
94 (E.D.Mich. 2010) (“individual mandate” held constitutional) and Liberty Univ., 
Inc. v. Geithner, No. 6:10-cv-00015-nkm, 2010 WL 4860299, at *14 (W.D.Va. Nov. 
30, 2010) (“individual mandate” held constitutional). 
  93 See generally Exclusions Program, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/exclusions.asp (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2011) (background information on the exclusions program); Stepha-
nie L. Trunk, Note, Sounding the Death Toll for Health Care Providers: How the 
Civil False Claims Act Has a Punitive Effect and Why the Act Warrants Reform of its 
Damages and Penalties Provision, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 159, 161 (2003) (“Provid-
ers who are found to have submitted false claims or settle false claims may also be 
subject to exclusion from the Medicare program under Title IX of the Social Security 
Act.”). 
  94 Trunk, supra note 93, at 161; see also Rich, supra note 91, at 1252 
(stating that “[e]xclusion or debarment can be the equivalent of the death penalty in 
the health care industry, where much of a provider’s business typically is dependent 
on Medicare reimbursement.”). 
 Furthermore, the loss Because loss of Medicare 
reimbursement can cause a provider to enter bankruptcy and thus, can 
drive a provider to bankruptcy, fear of exclusion often drives these 
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entities to settle FCA allegations, often before a qui tam complaint is 
even unsealed, rather than challenge the legal theories or factual alle-
gations.95
Because recently, however, there has been a suggestion that the 
unique status major pharmaceutical companies enjoy a unique status 
as providers of have by providing patent-protected drugs perceived as 
essential to consumers’ health, there is the suggestion that this places 
certain constraints on prosecutors’ ability to leverage exclusion as a 
possibility of FCA prosecution.
 
96 Given the widespread hardship ex-
clusion of a major pharmaceutical company would have on the bene-
ficiaries of the federal health care system, it is not clear whether the 
threat of exclusion will drive future settlement negotiations in off-
label promotion cases as much as it has in the past.97
In addition to the false claims for ineligible off-label prescription 
reimbursements, traditional FCA off-label promotion cases often in-
clude allegations of illegal marketing schemes that include kickbacks 
and self-referrals.
 
98 These allegations utilize additional provisions of 
the reimbursement framework that try to minimize the influence of 
financial incentives on physicians’ prescribing habits. While anti-
kickback and self-referral violations deal broadly with potentially 
problematic financial arrangements involving healthcare providers, 
the typical allegations seen in this context are specific to the financial 
relationships between pharmaceutical companies and physicians.99
  
  95 Trunk, supra note 93, at 161; see also Patricia Meador & Elizabeth S. 
Warren, The False Claims Act: A Civil War Relic Evolves into a Modern Weapon, 65 
TENN. L. REV. 455, 456 (1998) (discussing the aggressive enforcement of the FCA 
and its effect on qui tam actions). 
  96 Boozang, supra note 23, at 89-90 & n.6 (noting that there is more at 
stake in the health care context because federal prosecutors are aware of the impor-
tancs these companies have in society, causing some “[m]ajor pharmaceutical compa-
nies epitomize the ‘too big to fail’ situation.”). 
  97 See Medicare & Medicaid Services, Civil Money Penalties, Assess-
ments, Exclusions, 42 C.F.R. § 402.308 (2008) (providing CMS the ability to request 
a waiver of exclusion where it “negatively affects Medicare beneficiaries…because 
the excluded person is the sole community physician or sole source of essential spe-
cialized services in the Medicare community.”). 
  98 Hall & Berlin, supra note 47, at 659 (exploring recent cases involving 
illegal marketing schemes). 
  99 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis (Parke-Davis I), 
147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 53-54 (D. Mass. 2001) (“Relator contends that Parke-Davis vi-
olated the antikickback provision by, inter alia: paying doctors for inconsequential 
drug ‘studies’; paying doctors for minimal participation as ‘consultants’ or ‘precep-
tors’ or for participating in a ‘speakers bureau’; giving doctors cash payments for 
small record-keeping tasks, such as allowing Parke-Davis access to information about 
the doctors’ patients who were receiving Neurontin; and giving gifts such as travel 
and Olympics tickets to doctors prescribing large amounts of Parke-Davis drugs.”). 
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These relationships may arise out of company-sponsored speaker 
training and speaker programs or company-sponsored advisory boards 
where physicians are brought in as consultants.100 The goal of the sta-
tutes is to ensure that a physician’s professional judgment remain fo-
cused solely on her patient’s best interests and is free from undue in-
fluence by companies with financial interests in specific services or 
products.101
Use of the FCA to enforce the anti-kickback and self-referral sta-
tutes assumes that a reimbursement claim induced by an improper 
payment to the prescribing physician is a false claim. Assuming that 
the factual information provided on the face of the claim form is accu-
rate, the claim may still be considered “false” in one of two ways: (1) 
it is submitted for a service or prescription which is ineligible for 
reimbursement as a result of an improper payment, or (2) it is tar-
nished, or “tainted,” by the fact that the health care provider violated a 
separate underlying statute or regulation, including conditions of 
payment or participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
 
102 
While a violation of the anti-kickback statute is not a per se violation 
of the FCA,103
  
  100 Prior to January 2009, it was standard practice in the pharmaceutical 
industry to provide gifts to healthcare providers, such as pens, prescription pads, 
textbooks, bags, umbrellas, or free lunches for a physician’s office staff, which, if 
excessive, potentially ran afoul of the anti-kickback statute. However, gifts no longer 
play the prominent role they once did because of widespread adoption of the Code on 
Interactions with Healthcare Professionals by the Pharmaceutical Research and Man-
ufacturers of America (PhRMA). See PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., CODE ON 
INTERACTIONS WITH HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS (2008), available at 
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/108/phrma_marketing_code_2008.pdf (ef-
fective Jan. 1, 2009).  
  Federal prosecutors agree that the era of flagrant remuneration in exchange 
for prescriptions is effectively over. See Mary Anne Pazanowski, Government Attor-
neys Discuss Trends in Fraud Enforcement for Drugs, Devices, BNA’S HEALTH CARE 
FRAUD REP., Feb. 10, 2010, at 4 (“The ‘paying for prescriptions’ era is over…. The 
trends now seem to involve paying physicians for their knowledge and using science 
to market products.”). 
  101 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, FEDERAL 
ANTI-KICKBACK LAW AND REGULATORY SAFE HARBORS: FACT SHEET (Nov. 1999), 
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/safeharborregulations/safefs.htm. 
  102 See Dayna Bowen Matthew, Tainted Prosecution of Tainted Claims: 
The Law, Economics, and Ethics of Fighting Medical Fraud Under the Civil False 
Claims Act, 76 IND. L.J. 525, 533 (2001). 
 anti-kickback and self-referral violations may still be 
  103 See, e.g., Parke-Davis I, 147 F.Supp.2d at 54. But see, United States ex 
rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis (Parke-Davis II), No. Civ.A. 96-11651-PBS, 2003 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 15754, at *19-20 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2003) (“The Court agrees with the 
government that recent caselaw supports implied-certification FCA claims in the 
healthcare context, including kickback-based claims. But while the Government’s 
brief was persuasive on several points, the Government is (still) not a party to this 
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considered in determining causation under the first theory104
Under the criminal provisions of the anti-kickback statute, anyone 
who pays or receives a kickback to influence a healthcare provider’s 
prescribing habits can be found guilty of a felony and “fined not more 
than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.”
 and po-
tentially trigger parallel criminal investigations.  
105 
In addition, an anti-kickback violation can lead to exclusion from the 
federal health care program, and a civil fine of $50,000.106 Similarly, a 
self-referral violation can result in civil penalties including denial of 
federal payment for any services or products implicated by the prob-
lematic financial arrangement, refund of any payment received, a 
$15,000 per service civil monetary penalty or the imposition of a 
$100,000 civil monetary penalty for any arrangement considered to be 
a circumvention scheme.107
C. The Information Gap’s “Value” is not Worth the Price to the Fed-
eral Health Care System  
There is limited value in the inefficiency created by the informa-
tion gap for patients, physicians, pharmaceutical companies, pharmac-
ists, and those charged with protecting the integrity of the federal 
healthcare system. This value, though, is short-sighted and has come 
at the cost of the federal health care system as a whole. 
  
While this Article focuses primarily on limiting federal reim-
bursement to treatments that are supported by clinical evidence of 
safety and efficacy, the practice of medicine is inherently personal and 
experienced by most on an individual patient or individual practitioner 
level. A prescription drug that works for many patients will not work 
for all patients. Historically, much of our health care policy has been 
discussed and decided in terms of individual autonomy and privacy, 
for patients and practitioners alike. For example, the body of law sup-
porting the need for a patient’s informed consent before undergoing 
  
suit, and the Court declines to use the Government’s brief to revive Relator’s claim.”) 
(citations omitted). Thus, it still is not clear whether improper kickbacks and self-
referral arrangements between physicians and pharmaceutical companies will trigger 
liability under an implied certification theory on claims submitted by otherwise unin-
volved retail pharmacists. 
  104 See, e.g., Parke-Davis II, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754 at *20 (“Evi-
dence of kickbacks is relevant, however, to Relator’s more clear-cut claim under § 
3729(a)(1): Parke-Davis ‘caused to be presented’ claims for reimbursement for off-
label prescriptions that were ineligible for coverage under Medicaid.”). 
  105 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006). 
  106 § 1320a-7a(a). 
  107 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g) (2006). 
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medical procedures108 and the patient privacy provisions in HIPAA,109 
rests on the understanding that patients should be able to choose what 
happens to their bodies and personal information. In order to be effec-
tive, a comprehensive health care system should strive to protect this 
autonomy and privacy, but not at the expense of facilitating rampant 
fraud and improper payments.110
The federal government’s current efforts to recoup mispaid funds, 
though well-intended, are an insufficient and inefficient afterthought 
for a fundamentally broken billing system. Nevertheless, these efforts 
have provided real value in terms of employment and purpose for 
many Americans. Many a federal employee and contractor is specifi-
cally “charged with protecting the integrity of the [Medicare Part D 
prescription drug program]” and Medicaid programs.
  
111 This group 
includes legislators,112 CMS,113 the Office of Inspector General for the 
Department of Health and Human Services (OIG),114
  
  108 See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479, 
483-84 (Cal. 1990) (recognizing that a patient’s consent to treatment must be an in-
formed consent); Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 78 (N.J. 
2002) (stating that the informed consent requirement balances a “patient’s need for 
sufficient information with the doctor’s perception of the appropriate amount of in-
formation to impart for an informed decision”). 
  109 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, P.L. 
104-191, § 1177, 110 Stat. 1936, 2029 (1996) (discussing penalties for the wrongful 
disclosure of individually identifiable health information); see also HIPAA Privacy 
Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2010) (Subparts A & E).  
  110 See Cohen et al., supra note 23, at 394 (“Reimbursement restrictions on 
such uses could therefore negatively impact both physicians’ clinical autonomy and 
health outcomes. Nevertheless, given that resources are finite, off-label use reim-
bursement implies an opportunity cost: the more off-label uses payers reimburse, the 
fewer resources they may have for on-label uses.”). 
  111 Vito, supra note 64, at 1. 
  112 See Combating Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Hearing Before the H. 
Appropriations Subcomm. on Labor, Health & Human Servs., Educ., & Related 
Agencies, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement of Rep. David R. Obey, Chairman, H. 
Appropriations Subcomm. On Labor, Health & Human Servs., and Educ.) (“Congress 
has an obligation to meet the needs of people who qualify for programs covered by 
this appropriation bill. In doing that, we also have an obligation to try to assure that 
taxpayers’ funds are used effectively—and not wasted or lost to fraud.”).  
  113 See Vito, supra note 64, at 3 (noting that as the program administrator, 
CMS is required to perform financial audits of the contracted Part D plan sponsors 
and may “conduct a number other types of audits of plan sponsors, including bid 
audits, program audits, benefit integrity audits, and compliance plan audits”).  
  114 “OIG is comprised of more than 1,500 professionals who perform 
comprehensive health care oversight and enforcement activities, including: 
 • Office of Investigations: conducts criminal, civil, and administrative inves-
tigations of health care fraud, which result in convictions, civil and administrative 
actions, and monetary recoveries; 
 Medicare Part D 
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plan sponsors,115 and program integrity contractors.116 In addition to 
these parties, the U.S. Department of Justice, state attorneys general, 
whistleblowers, private counsel for whistleblowers, and defense coun-
sel for pharmaceutical companies rely, at least in part, on federal 
health care fraud enforcement efforts for their livelihoods.117
  
 • Offices of Audit Services: conducts and oversees audits of Medicare and 
Medicaid payments and operations; identifies improper payments and program vulne-
rabilities; and recommends audit disallowances and program improvements; 
  
 • Office of Evaluation and Inspections: conducts evaluations of the Medi-
care and Medicaid programs to identify program integrity vulnerabilities and make 
recommendations to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse and to promote economy, effi-
ciency, and effectiveness; and 
 • Office of Counsel to the Inspector General: represents OIG in all civil and 
administrative fraud and abuse cases, and in connection with these cases, negotiates 
and monitors corporate integrity agreements; provides guidance to the health care 
industry to promote compliance; and provides legal support to OIG operations.”  
  Vito, supra note 64, at 1-2. In the five years that Medicare Part D has been 
in effect, OIG has generated over 30 reports on the program and anticipates at least 25 
more. See id. at 12-14. Needless to say, these reports represent a significant invest-
ment of human and financial resources toward oversight of Part D.  
  115 See id. at 3. (“Within the Medicare program, the responsibility for 
ensuring integrity in the Part D program is shared between Part D plan sponsors, 
program integrity contractors, and CMS. The plan sponsors serve as the first line of 
defense against fraud in the Part D program and CMS requires that plan sponsors 
have compliance plans in place to protect the integrity of the program. CMS requires 
plan sponsors to include certain elements in their compliance plans. These elements 
include the designation of a compliance officer, the establishment of effective com-
pliance training for employees and contractors, and the establishment of procedures 
for effective internal monitoring and auditing. CMS also requires compliance plans to 
have measures to detect, correct, and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.”).  
  116 See id. (CMS also “contracts with Medicare Drug Integrity Contractors 
(MEDICs) to perform integrity functions such as identifying and investigating poten-
tial fraud, waste, and abuse in the Part D program.” MEDICs are responsible for 
auditing plan sponsors’ compliance plans and identifying fraud through data analy-
sis.). 
  117 See Combating Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Hearing Before the H. 
Appropriations Subcomm. on Labor, Health & Human Servs., Educ., & Related 
Agencies, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement of Timothy J. Menke, Dep. Inspector Gen. 
for Investigations, Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.) 
[hereinafter Menke] (“OIG is not alone in the fight to combat fraud and protect the 
integrity of Federal health care programs. We work closely with the Department of 
Justice (DOJ), our Federal, State, and local law enforcement partners, and our col-
leagues at the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Food and 
Drug Administration. Additionally, commercial and private insurance entities and 
trade associations, such as the National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association 
(NHCAA), are also involved in the identification and prevention of health care 
fraud.”). 
  While not specific to a FCA action for health care fraud, the example 
provided by Pamela Bucy in her article, Private Justice, is equally representative of 
the resources often devoted to FCA actions for off-label promotion. Bucy, supra note 
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While some are likely motivated by altruistic intentions, it seems 
more than likely that they, like the infamous twentieth-century bank 
robber Willie Sutton, also do what they do “[b]ecause that’s where the 
money is.”118
  
66, at 58-59 (“Recent examples demonstrate the formidable legal and investigative 
resources the FCA brings to the public regulatory efforts. In one qui tam FCA case, 
six law firms devoted forty lawyers (twenty full time equivalents) to the case, and 
incurred $1 million in fees and expenses per month while the case was being inten-
sively litigated. In another recent qui tam FCA case, where there were 125 defense 
attorneys, fifteen relators’ attorneys, plus DOJ attorneys, the federal courthouse was 
not large enough to accommodate the group for docket calls. The defendant, Shell Oil 
Company, produced 7,000 banker boxes of records. One of the relators’ counsel took 
responsibility for handling all documents in the case. Doing so required 5,000 square 
feet of warehouse space (with the record boxes stacked seven feet high). This relator’s 
counsel organized the records so that plaintiffs could respond to any defense request 
for identification of any record pertaining to any particular claim within thirty days by 
production of a CD containing the requested records. This case was settled with a 
recovery to the U.S. Treasury of $400 million and a realtor’s share of $64 million.”) 
(footnotes omitted).  
  118 Carper, supra note 10, at 2. See also Pamela H. Bucy, Game Theory 
and the Civil False Claims Act: Iterated Games and Close-knit Groups, 35 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 1021, 1034 (2004) (“Assistant U.S. Attorneys vie for meritorious FCA qui 
tam cases because the greater FCA recoveries that an office can garner, the more 
resources and recognition within the DOJ that office obtains. In addition, individual 
attorneys within the DOJ advance their careers, inside the DOJ and beyond, by han-
dling high profile, large-dollar FCA cases.”); Joan H. Krause, “Promises to Keep”: 
Health Care Providers and the Civil False Claims Act, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1363, 
1412 (2002) (describing the personal agendas of some U.S. Attorneys); Matthew, 
supra note 102, at 582 (“[T]he presence of financial incentives offers an explanation 
for the reason the government is pursuing increasingly aggressive and arguably ques-
tionable theories of recovery against health care providers in anti-kickback and self-
referral cases.”); Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem With Privatiza-
tion of Public Enforcement: The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 281, 300 n.69 (2007) (“The Government does bear some minimal monitoring 
costs. Some argument can also be made that the more the Government entertains 
frivolous suits, the more it signals a willingness to participate in specious litigation, 
thus inviting an increase in the number of cases that it has to monitor but would not 
pursue.”); Rich, supra note 91, at 1260 (“[T]he costs of dismissing the suit include 
any harm caused by permitting the defendant’s conduct to continue and the detriment 
to the government and the individual prosecutor of foregoing the possible benefits of 
a favorable outcome. These potential benefits include the majority of any settlement 
or judgment obtained that is returned to the government fisc, the specific portion of 
the proceeds that becomes available to the DOJ for future FCA investigations, and the 
political benefits to an individual prosecutor of a successful recovery.”) (footnotes 
omitted).  
 To quote Senator Thomas R. Carper, Chairman of the 
Senate Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government 
Information, Federal Services, and International Security, “[t]here is a 
lot of money in Medicare, and that attracts a lot of criminal activi-
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ty.”119 In turn, a lot of criminal activity attracts a lot of attention from 
legislators, regulators, lawyers, auditors, accountants, compliance 
officers, and reporters, provided the funding is available to pay for all 
of these professionals’ services (see Figure 2, below).120
  
  119 Carper, supra note 10, at 2; see also Menke, supra note 117, at 4 
(“Health care fraud is attractive to organized crime because: (1) the penalties are 
lower than those for other organized-crime-related offenses (e.g., offenses related to 
illegal drugs); (2) there are low barriers to entry (e.g., a criminal can obtain a supplier 
number, gather some beneficiary numbers and bill the program); (3) schemes are 
easily replicated; and (4) there is the perception of the low risk of detection.”).  
  120 Compare Indigent Representation: A Growing National Crisis: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Rep. Robert C. Scott, Chairman, 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the Comm. on the Judiciary) 
(“Researchers have estimated that between 80 and 90 percent of all state criminal 
defendants rely on indigent defense systems for counsel.”), and Eric Holder, Attorney 
Gen., Addressing the Dep’t of Justice Nat’l Symposium on Indigent Defense: Look-
ing Back, Looking Forward, 2000–2010 (Feb. 18, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-100218.html) (“As we all know, 
public defender programs are too many times under-funded. Too often, defenders 
carry huge caseloads that make it difficult, if not impossible, for them to fulfill their 
legal and ethical responsibilities to their clients. Lawyers buried under these caseloads 
often can’t interview their clients properly, file appropriate motions, conduct fact 
investigations, or spare the time needed to ask and apply for additional grant fund-
ing.”), with Combating Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Hearing Before H. Subcomm. 
on Labor, Health & Human Servs., Educ., & Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on 
Appropriations, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement of Daniel Levinson, Inspector Gen., 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.) [hereinafter Levinson] (“[T]he President’s 
Budget for FY 2011 requests approximately $272 million in Medicare and Medicaid 
integrity funding for OIG, a net increase of $40 million….OIG’s funding is used to 
hire and support investigators, auditors, evaluators, attorneys, and management and 
support staff to carry out our mission and functions.”). 
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Figure 2. Flow of money from taxpayers to parties who rely, at least in part, on feder-
al health care fraud enforcement efforts for their livelihoods. Parties represented in 
rectangles are necessary for the delivery of Medicare and Medicaid program benefits. 
Parties represented in ovals only get involved in efforts to recoup improper payments. 
 
Luckily for those invested in health care fraud enforcement ef-
forts, legislation geared towards enforcement is easier to get through 
Congress than legislation to overhaul the federal healthcare system. 
As an example, on May 20, 2009, barely three and a half months after 
it was first introduced to the Senate on February 5, 2009, President 
Obama signed into law the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 
2009 (“FERA”), which significantly expanded whistleblowers’ ability 
to bring FCA actions.121
  
  121 Congress considered the FERA as “an Act to improve enforcement of 
mortgage fraud, securities and commodities fraud, financial institution fraud, and 
other frauds related to Federal assistance and relief programs, for the recovery of 
funds lost to these frauds, and for other purposes.” Fraud Enforcement and Recovery 
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617. As it pertained specifically to the 
False Claims Act, the FERA amendments were meant to “clarif[y]…the False Claims 
Act to reflect the original intent of the law.” Id. The amendments passed under FERA 
were preceded by “[o]ther amendments [that] made FCA cases easier to prove over-
all, thereby improving all plaintiffs’ chances of success. These amendments included 
relaxing the mens rea requirement…and clarifying that the preponderance burden of 
proof, rather than a clear and convincing burden of proof, applies to FCA cases.” 
Bucy, supra note 66, at 46-47. 
 By contrast, Congressional attempts to 
reform the national healthcare system were in process for well over a 
year, accompanied by acrimonious political partisanship and subse-
quent challenges from individual states. The complexity of the nation-
al healthcare system, including the parameters of coverage and reim-
bursement rates, is arguably ill-suited to the nature of the Congres-
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sional process. As a result, the historical revision and amendment of 
the Social Security Act has resulted in piecemeal health care legisla-
tion that ignores the underlying systemic inefficiencies. 
In addition, the costs and benefits of enforcement are quantifiable 
while the value of deterrence and prevention remains abstract because 
it requires weighing the costs of compliance efforts against “what 
might have been.”122 Through FCA enforcement actions, the federal 
government pursued and received “$1.12 billion in recoveries from 
health care fraud, waste, and abuse,” during 2008 alone.123 According 
to one estimate, the federal government recovers $15 for every $1 
invested in FCA investigations and prosecutions in the health care 
arena.124 This estimate suggests that the FCA is a particularly efficient 
and effective means of recouping improperly paid funds, especially 
when compared to the $6 to $1 average return-on-investment reported 
by the Office of Inspector General for the Department of Health and 
Human Services for the Healthcare Fraud and Abuse Control Account 
or the $4 to $1 return on investment reported by the Department of 
Justice.125 The increased efficiency of the FCA is due, at least in part, 
to the government’s ability to tap into the private law enforcement 
ranks of qui tam relators and relators’ counsel, and the insider infor-
mation they receive because of the financial incentive provided by the 
FCA.126
  
  122 Vito, supra note 64, at 2 (“In FY 2009, OIG investigations resulted in 
$4 billion in settlements and court-ordered fines, penalties, and restitution, and in 671 
criminal actions. OIG audits results in almost $500 million in receivables through 
recommended disallowances. OIG also produced equally important but less quantifia-
ble gains in deterrence and prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse.”). 
  123 Dinh Nguyen, Renewed Scrutiny of the Pharmaceutical and Medical 
Device Industries and Research Institutions in 2010, BNA MEDICAL RES. LAW & 
POL’Y REP., Feb. 17, 2010, at 3. 
  124 False Claim Act Statistics, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUCATION 
FUND, http://www.taf.org/statistics.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2011) (The Taxpayers 
Against Fraud Education Fund (TAF) is a nonprofit public interest organization dedi-
cated to combating fraud against the Federal Government through the promotion and 
use of the federal False Claims Act and its qui tam provisions). 
  125 Levinson, supra note 120, at 6 (reporting the OIG figures); Enforce-
ment of the Criminal Laws Against Medicare and Medicaid Fraud: Hearing before H. 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement of Greg Andres, Acting Deputy Ass’t Att’y 
Gen., U.S. Department of Justice) [hereinafter Andres] (reporting the DOJ figures). 
  126 See Sharon Finegan, The False Claims Act and Corporate Criminal 
Liability: Qui Tam Actions, Corporate Integrity Agreements and the Overlap of Crim-
inal and Civil Law, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 625, 653 (2007) (“[T]he use of qui tam suits 
in civil actions under the FCA has created an enforcement mechanism greater in 
resources and potential prosecutors than any governmental criminal enforcement 
body. Thus, the FCA has a greater enforcement power than that available in most 
criminal actions.”). 
 Unfortunately, as a result of the financial incentives of the 
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FCA, whistleblowers and lawyers (both in private practice and work-
ing for the government) are more likely to find real value in filing ex 
post lawsuits as compared to ex ante internal compliance reporting or 
other systemic changes.127 The resulting multi-million or billion dollar 
cases against pharmaceutical companies may be considered headline-
worthy, but still only skim the surface of the fraud, abuse, and waste 
in the federal health care system.128
If CMS decides to require diagnosis codes on claims for reim-
bursement of outpatient prescription drugs the opportunity to collect 
from pharmaceutical companies under the False Claims Act may de-
crease
  
129
  
  127 Pursuant to the many Corporate Integrity Agreements currently in place 
between pharmaceutical companies and the OIG, the companies have implemented 
extensive internal compliance departments and reporting systems. See OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CORPORATE INTEGRITY 
AGREEMENTS DOCUMENT LIST, http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/cia_list.asp (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2011). These compliance programs (as well as those voluntarily adopted by 
companies who have not entered a Corporate Integrity Agreement) usually require a 
designated compliance officer to educate and train all company officers, directors, 
employees, contractors, and agents on critical laws and regulations including the anti-
kickback, self-referral, misbranding, and FCA whistleblower statutes, and regularly 
report to the company’s board of directors, CEO or president, about ongoing com-
pliance efforts and internal investigations, including the nature of any investigation, 
its results, and any remedial or disciplinary action taken. See Draft OIG Compliance 
Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 67 Fed. Reg. 62,057, 62,064 
(Oct. 3, 2002).  
  128 In the 13 years since the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program 
has been in effect, it has returned $15 billion to the federal government. Grindler, 
supra note 65, at 3-4. The largest single criminal and civil settlement for health care 
fraud to date is $2.3 billion. See Pfizer Settlement Agreement, supra note 2. While 
these numbers represent significant efforts by the federal government’s law enforce-
ment programs, they amount to only 3% or less than 0.5% of the annual Medicare 
spending, respectively. See The Enforcement of Criminal Laws Against Medicare and 
Medicaid Fraud: Hearing Before H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland 
Sec. of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 6 (2010) (statement of James Frogue, 
Vice President, Center for Health Transformation) [hereinafter Frogue] (stating that 
“[o]ne percent of annual Medicare spending is $5 billion.”). 
 and liability for specific false claims that make it through the 
  129 See Grindler, supra note 65, at 11-12 (“At the end of FY 2009, the 
USAOs reported that there were several dozen pharmaceutical, as well as, other com-
plex health care fraud investigations pending—with potential significant recoveries—
and following the landmark settlements of the last year, a large number of additional 
qui tams have been filed in the first few months of FY 2010. These cases not only 
represent potential recoveries in the billions of dollars, but the opportunity to change 
the current corporate culture that is so harmful to the financial health of the federal, 
state and private health care programs. This funding for attorney and support person-
nel, as well as, for litigation expenses including, the creation of databases to house 
billions of documents, expert analysis of Medicare and Medicaid data, and medical 
consultants to unravel the sophisticated fraud schemes is essential to the successful 
resolution of these important cases. In addition to supporting the investigation and 
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real-time review of the prescriptions will fall more squarely on indi-
vidual prescribers and pharmacists instead of larger corporations.130
If the information gap is fixed, one of the critical legal theories 
that have driven qui tam actions for the past decade may no longer be 
available to relators’ counsel or the government. Even so, the criminal 
and civil remedies provided by the FDCA, the anti-kickback, and the 
self-referral statutes remain available, in addition to a veritable laun-
dry list of other criminal provisions.
 
Of course, assuming an effective real-time review of prescriptions, 
any improper payments for medically inappropriate off-label use will 
be those payments that went forward due to a coding error on the part 
of the insurer’s review algorithm (in which case these payments 
should be easily identified in a post-payment audit of the drugs and 
diagnosis codes), or those deliberately miscoded by physicians and 
pharmacists in order to treat their patients. While the ethical question 
of whether miscoding should be prosecuted when done in the interest 
of patient health remains, deliberate miscoding does render the infor-
mation submitted in the claim inconsistent with the actual purpose for 
a prescription, rendering the claim “false” for purposes of the FCA.  
131
  
litigation of pending cases, this funding would provide the AUSAs with the opportu-
nity to pro-actively pursue the large dollar frauds, i.e., pharmaceutical and medical 
devise fraud. Combining the knowledge and experience gained from numerous inves-
tigations with sophisticated data analysis, the AUSAs, with their colleagues in the 
Civil Division, could identify high dollar, over utilized, and inappropriately promoted 
drugs, procedures, and other services.”).  
  130 See Andres, supra note 125, at 6 (“The primary enforcement tool pos-
sessed by the Department of Justice to pursue civil remedies in health care fraud 
matters is the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733.”); Frogue, supra 
note 128, at 6 (“Many of the attorneys and investigators I have spoken with off the 
record say that prosecutions focus almost exclusively on very large cases where con-
victions are a virtual slam dunk. The message criminals hear is that they should just 
not get too greedy. So long as their theft remains in the tens of thousands of dollars, 
they need not fear prosecution. Those smaller activities multiplied across the country 
thousands of times likely add up to far more dollars than the marquee indictments, 
prosecutions and convictions.”).  
  The financial stability of a publicly-traded company also makes collection 
of any eventual verdict or settlement easier than the smaller, more transient compa-
nies seen in many of the fraudulent billing schemes prosecuted by the DOJ and OIG. 
Perez, supra note 88, at 2 (Once CMS paid the claims and deposited “money into the 
company’s bank account, it was withdrawn within days using multiple check cashers. 
The idea was to deplete the account so that once Medicare discovered the fraudulent 
billing, which could take 6 months to 1 year, there would be no money in the ac-
count.”).  
 
  131 Andres, supra note 125, at 7 (“[T]he Civil Division, as a part of our 
health care fraud enforcement efforts, investigates and pursues False Claims Act 
matters that are predicated on claims that doctors and others were paid kickbacks or 
other illegal remuneration to induce referrals of Medicare or Medicaid patients in 
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III. THE BETTER SOLUTION 
Despite the “value” of the inefficiency created by the information 
gap in the Medicare and Medicaid billing systems, this gap should be 
eliminated by requiring diagnosis codes on all claims for reimburse-
ment of outpatient prescription drugs. Eliminating the systemic dis-
connect between a physician’s diagnosis of a patient and a pharmac-
ist’s submission of a claim for an outpatient prescription drug has the 
potential to both reduce federal health care spending and improve 
public safety.132
A. Protection of the Public Fisc 
 
The amount of taxpayer money tied up in the federal health care 
system for the reimbursement of outpatient prescription drugs is stag-
gering, as is the amount of money wasted due to health care fraud.133 
In its current iteration, oversight by CMS, plan sponsors, and benefit 
integrity contractors has been limited and “the program is vulnerable 
to fraud, waste, and abuse.”134
  
violation of the Physician Self-Referral laws, commonly referred to as the ‘Stark’ 
laws, the Anti-kickback Statute, and the civil monetary penalties statute. These sta-
tutes have been extremely important in protecting the integrity of our health care 
system and have proven useful in going after fraudsters.”); see Menke, supra note 
117, at 4-5 (stating that current criminal statutes available for prosecuting fraud in-
clude the Health Care Fraud statute (18 U.S.C. § 1347), Criminal Forfeiture statute 
(18 U.S.C. § 982), Conspiracy to Commit Health Care Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1349), 
Conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371) charged in combination with False, Fictitious, or Frau-
dulent Claims (18 U.S.C. § 287), Laundering of Monetary Instruments (18 U.S.C. § 
1956), Criminal Penalties for Acts Involving Federal Health Care Programs (42 
U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)), and Aggravated Identity Theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028A)). 
  132 On occasion, the prescription of drugs for off-label use can result in 
both harm to patients as well as the public fisc. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 39, at 6 
(“Two Washington state providers, one a physician, maintained a medical practice 
where they treated patients for pain management. They were indicted for unlawfully 
billing several governmental health care benefit programs and prescribing Methadone, 
Oxycontin and Oxycodone for improper purposes, resulting in at least one death. The 
physician was sentenced to nine months in prison and ordered to pay restitution and 
fees.”).  
  133 See Perez, supra note 88, at 1 (descibing how in one investigation OIG 
uncovered a scheme involving over $200 million in fraudlent billing to Medicare over 
two years); Vito, supra note 64, at 1 (“With approximately $50 billion at risk in the 
[Medicare Part D drug] program each year, it is important that all of us who have 
programmatic and oversight responsibilities work collaboratively to ensure that pro-
gram vulnerabilities are identified and resolved.”).  
  134 Vito, supra note 64, at 1; see also Carper, supra note 10, at 2 (“Unfor-
tunately, Health and Human Services has not been able to determine the level [of 
waste and fraud] for the prescription drug program, so the amount wasted in Medicare 
Part D is still largely unknown.”).  
 In particular, CMS needs to improve its 
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oversight of Part D payments for outpatient prescription drugs.135 De-
spite the government’s goal of addressing fraud “as early as [it] can in 
the process,”136 CMS and its contractors lack a centralized data repo-
sitory for proactive data monitoring.137 As a result, there has been no 
significant Part D data analysis conducted by CMS or its contractors 
to specifically detect or prevent fraud and abuse because the contrac-
tors encountered significant delays in receiving access to the neces-
sary data.138
Even if the contractors charged with auditing the Part D data were 
granted full access to the underlying claims and data, an audit is inhe-
rently reactive and only as good as the data being audited.
  
139 At 
present, the Part D data provides no information about patient diag-
noses.140 The diagnosis data necessary for evaluating eligibility of 
outpatient prescription drug claims is only available for Medicare Part 
A and Part B.141
  
  135 See Vito, supra note 64, at 7. The Medicaid statute already requires 
covered outpatient drug use reviews from the individual states in order to assure that 
prescriptions are appropriate, are medically necessary, and are not likely to result in 
adverse medical results. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r–8(g) (West 2010). These reviews 
are intended to generate information “to educate physicians and pharmacists to identi-
fy and reduce the frequency of patterns of fraud, abuse, gross overuse, or inappro-
priate or medically unnecessary care.” Id. 
  136 Vito, supra note 64, at 10. 
  137 Id. at 4. 
  138 Id. at 5 (“[Medicare Drug Integrity Contractors] did not receive access 
to [Part D prescription drug event] data until August 2007; nearly a year after their 
contracts began. Once they received access to PDE data, [the contractors] found that 
there were significant limitations in the data and important variables were not availa-
ble or were stored incorrectly. In addition, two [contractors] were not given access to 
Part B data (physician services) until the fall of 2008 and the third [contractor] did not 
receive access to Part B data before its contract ended.”).  
  139 This is especially a concern for Medicaid data. See MEMORANDUM 
REPORT: MSIS DATA, supra note 13 (On August 26, 2009 OIG sent a letter to the 
CMS Director of State Operations essentially saying that the Medicaid’s data collec-
tion is so poor OIG cannot accurately measure the extent of fraud in the Medicaid 
system.). 
  140 See Perez, supra note 88, at 3 (explaining that the claims data currently 
used by the Medicare Strike Force Teams to identify fraudulent schemes includes: 
total amount paid; dates of service; referring/ordering physicians; beneficiaries; claim 
dates; types of procedures billed; place of service; provider banking information; and 
ownership status). While these are helpful data points for tracking outlier claims 
generally, they are specific to Medicare Parts A and B. The addition of linked pre-
scription drug and diagnosis data could only strengthen their analytic tools. 
 While requiring diagnosis codes on reimbursement 
  141 Vito, supra note 64, at 4-5 (“[Medicare Drug Integrity Contractors] 
reported that they needed both [Part D prescription drug event] data and Part B data to 
effectively identify and investigate potential fraud and abuse incidents.”). In addition, 
the contractors also “lack [the] authority to directly obtain information, such as pre-
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claims for outpatient prescription drugs will not provide enough in-
formation to sniff out all fraud, abuse, or waste, it would potentially 
allow automated real-time evaluation of prescription drug claim eligi-
bility, eliminate the need to cross-reference data from Part B claims, 
and provide information sufficient to flag potentially problematic pre-
scribing patterns for further investigation.142
The current health care fraud enforcement methods within the 
DOJ rely heavily on data mining.
 
143 The inclusion of diagnosis codes 
on Medicare Part D claims would allow for more targeted enforce-
ment instead of the current nationwide investigations that are enorm-
ously inefficient and resource intensive. The Department of Health 
and Human Services anticipates spending $15 million to $20 million 
of its allocated federal funds to upgrade Medicare and Medicaid 
claims databases used by investigators to catch individuals commit-
ting health care fraud.144
  
scription and medical records from pharmacies, pharmacy benefit managers, and 
physicians.” Id. at 5. 
  142 See Menke, supra note 117, at 6 (“Real-time access to data is critical to 
the success of the [Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team] 
Strike Force initiative.”); Perez, supra note 88, at 3 (“Before Strike Force teams were 
initiated, the referrals we received contained billing data that was typically between 6 
months and 1 year old. Today, the data we receive provides billing information that is 
only 2 to 3 weeks old. In South Florida, as elsewhere, criminals can receive several 
hundred thousand dollars in fraudulent payments within a matter of weeks. The abili-
ty to retrieve real-time data, meaning being able to access claims data within hours of 
the claims being submitted, would allow us to potentially obtain evidence immediate-
ly to substantiate fraudulent activity, thus stopping the payment of a significant 
amount of money and catching the criminals before they and the money disappear.”). 
See also Frogue, supra note 128, at 3-4 (providing example of how real-time data 
analysis allows credit card companies to flag problematic behavior and significantly 
reduce fraud in the system).  
 One of the upgrades that should be included 
in this effort is directly linking prescription drug claim data to diagno-
sis codes. 
  143 The DOJ is currently using data analysis techniques in an interagency 
Medicare Fraud Strike Force model in seven cities: Miami, Los Angeles, Detroit, 
Houston, Brooklyn, Tampa and Baton Rouge. See Medicare Fraud Strike Force 
Expands Operations, STOP MEDICARE FRAUD.GOV, http://www.stopmedicarefraud. 
gov/heatsuccess/taskforces.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). See also James Swann, 
DOJ Prosecutor Details Enforcement Methods for Combatting Health Care Fraud, 
14 BNA HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. 151, 184 (2010) (“The strike force model entails 
extensive data mining…[and requires] matching [Medicare] data from a metropolitan 
area with national data and then searching for anomalies.” By using this method, the 
DOJ “speeds up the process of getting defendants into the system to be prosecuted.”). 
  144 Corr, supra note 6. 
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B. Improving Public Health 
In addition to helping CMS, OIG, and DOJ in their efforts to fight 
health care fraud, the new data generated by including diagnosis codes 
on claims for reimbursement of outpatient prescription drugs could 
also be used to support currents efforts by the FDA and pharmaceuti-
cal companies to monitor prescription drug post-marketing risks and 
minimize abuse, overdose, and inappropriate prescribing.  
The past decade has been fraught with patient safety concerns re-
lated to the use and abuse of prescription drugs. One of the most wide-
ly-covered stories, that concerning the safety of the painkiller Vioxx 
(rofecoxib), arose out of cardiovascular safety concerns that could not 
have been detected from the clinical trials conducted for purposes of 
FDA-approval.145 Following the voluntary recall of Vioxx, the Insti-
tute of Medicine (at FDA’s request) undertook an extensive evalua-
tion of the prescription drug safety system in place at the time and 
issued a list of recommendations for improving the system.146 Many 
of the Institute of Medicine’s recommendations were then incorpo-
rated into the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 
2007 (FDAAA),147 including significant authority for FDA post-
marketing risk assessment for prescription drugs.148
The FDAAA requires the FDA to establish an active post-
marketing risk identification system for the timely identification of 
potential risks associated with prescription drug use.
  
149
  
  145 Merck did not specifically test for the cardiovascular risks, raised by 
clinical studies completed after FDA approval. See Alex Berenson, Gardiner Harris, 
Barry Meier & Andrew Pollack, Despite Warnings, Drug Giant Took Long Path to 
Vioxx Recall, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com 
/2004/11/14/business/14merck.html. 
  146 COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. DRUG SAFETY SYS., THE 
FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 2 
(2007) (“[T]he committee considered the drug safety system as the sum of all activi-
ties conducted by FDA and other stakeholders to monitor, evaluate, improve, and 
ensure drug safety…. Although much of the committee’s work was focused on drug 
review, safety surveillance, and related activities of CDER, the committee also re-
viewed some key aspects of the roles and considered the potential contributions of the 
pharmaceutical industry, the academic research enterprise, Congress, the health care 
delivery system, patients, and the public.”). 
  147 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 
110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007). 
  148 See Bruce M. Psaty & David Korn, Congress Responds to IOM Drug 
Safety Report—In Full, 298 JAMA 2185 (2007) (“The FDAAA gives the FDA the 
authority to require postmarketing studies to identify or assess potential serious 
risks.”). 
  149 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3) (2006) (Active postmarket risk identification). 
 It also gave 
the FDA authority to require drug manufacturers to submit proposed 
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Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) to ensure that the 
benefits of their drugs outweigh the risks to patients taking their 
drugs.150 When evaluating the appropriateness of a REMS, the FDA is 
required to consider: the estimated size of the population likely to use 
the drug involved, the seriousness of the disease or condition that is to 
be treated with the drug, the expected benefit of the drug with respect 
to such disease or condition, the expected or actual duration of treat-
ment with the drug, and the seriousness of any known or potential 
adverse events that may be related to the drug and the background 
incidence of such events in the population likely to use the drug.151 
This type of patient-specific and treatment-specific information is 
often difficult for drug companies to collect outside of their own 
sponsored clinical trials due to patient privacy statutes.152 Controlled 
clinical trials, however, are limited in their ability to predict drug effi-
cacy and safety in actual medical practice due to the necessity to es-
tablish selection criteria for clinical trial subjects.153
If diagnosis codes were required for federal reimbursement of 
outpatient prescription drugs, the data generated by Medicare Part D 
and Medicaid claims could provide much of this information and it 
would be indicative of drug use in actual medical practice. Indeed, 
Medicare Part D data is already available upon request to the FDA for 
research purposes, but does not include patient diagnosis data.
  
154
  
  150 § 355-1 (Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies). 
  151 § 355-1(a)(1) (factors considered in determining if a risk evaluation and 
mitigation strategy is necessary). 
  152 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a) (2006) (covering the illegality of wrongful-
ly disclosing individually identifiable health information); Hall & Berlin, supra note 
47, at 656 (“The manufacturer rarely has any knowledge of, or involvement with, the 
specific patient and his or her therapy. Manufacturers cannot practice medicine and 
are rarely involved in actual treatment.”).  
  There are private sector companies, like Intercontinental Marketing Ser-
vices (IMS) Health, that sell information about doctors’ prescribing habits, but they 
purchase supporting data primarily from pharmacies. See Jacob Goldstein, Should 
Docs’ Prescribing Habits Be for Sale?, WALL ST. J. HEALTH BLOG (Dec. 11, 2009, 
8:51 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2009/12/11/should-docs-prescribing-habits-be-
for-sale (“Companies like IMS buy the information from pharmacies, crunch it, and 
sell it to drug companies, which use it to guide the way they market drugs to individ-
ual doctors (the records identify doctors but not patients).”). 
  153 See generally Norman Sharpe, Clinical Trials and the Real World: 
Selection Bias and Generalisabiliy of Trial Results, 16 CARDIOVASCULAR DRUGS & 
THERAPY 75 (2002). 
 In-
  154 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r–8(g) (West 2010) (The Medicaid statute al-
ready requires covered outpatient drug use reviews from the individual states in order 
to assure that prescriptions are appropriate, medically necessary, and not likely to 
result in adverse medical results. Further, these reviews are intended to generate in-
formation to educate physicians and pharmacists “to identify and reduce the frequen-
cy of patterns of fraud, abuse, gross overuse, or inappropriate or medically unneces-
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creasing the amount of personalized health information in a single 
database hardly seems problematic in itself, but there may be concerns 
about the increased circulation of that information. Admittedly, the 
ethical, legal, and social concerns implicated by use of Medicare and 
Medicaid data for widespread human subject research, as defined and 
regulated by the Common Rule, 45 C.F.R. Part 46 (Protection of Hu-
man Subjects), are many but beyond the scope of this article.  
Also, one of the “elements to assure safe use” associated with ex-
isting REMS is a proactive, real-time check at the dispensing pharma-
cy that patients are being treated solely for an on-label disease or con-
dition.155 While the administrative and logistical hurdles put in place 
for prescription drugs under REMS are not needed for most prescrip-
tion drugs, requiring diagnosis codes for reimbursement of outpatient 
prescription drugs would provide retail pharmacists with patient-
specific diagnosis information that would allow them to better moni-
tor their patients’ medications for prescribing errors.156
  
sary care.”); 42 C.F.R. § 423 (2010) (explaining that Medicare Part D data is already 
available upon request to the FDA for research purposes, but does not include patient 
diagnosis data).  
  155 For example, Onsolis is a painkiller currently sold by MEDA Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc. According to the FDA-approved product labeling for Onsolis, 
“ONSOLIS is an opioid analgesic indicated only for the management of breakthrough 
pain in patients with cancer, 18 years of age and older, who are already receiving and 
who are tolerant to opioid therapy for their underlying persistent cancer pain.” MEDA 
Pharm., Inc., Onsolis Prescribing Information, ONSOLIS.COM (July 2009), 
http://www.onsolisHCP.com/assets/downloads/onsolis_pi.pdf (emphasis in original).  
  
The Onsolis REMS requires, as one of its elements to assure safe use, that (1) physi-
cians prescribing Onsolis “[e]nsure appropriate patient selection, including that the 
patient is opioid tolerant,” (2) patients prescribed Onsolis “complete and sign the 
Patient Enrollment Form,” which is in turn faxed by the prescribing physician to a 
centralized database maintained and monitored by the manufacturer, and (3) pharma-
cies dispensing Onsolis certify that all pharmacy staff dispensing Onsolis are trained 
on the REMS procedures, which include confirming that both the prescribing physi-
cian and patient are actively enrolled in the centralized database before dispensing the 
drug to the patient. Questions and Answers about Onsolis (fentanyl buccal soluble 
film), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 16, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/ 
Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm17
2039.htm#BriefSummariesofREMSElements (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
  156 Medicare Part D already recognizes the value of pharmacist review and 
management of patient prescription medication by requiring all Part D sponsors to 
have quality assurance programs. See 42 C.F.R. § 423.153(c) (2010). The quality 
assurance program requires point-of-sale review of prescriptions for potential drug 
therapy problems due to therapeutic duplication, age or gender-related contraindica-
tions, over-utilization and under-utilization, drug-drug interactions, incorrect drug 
dosage or duration of drug therapy, drug-allergy contraindications, and clinical abuse 
or misuse. § 423.153(c)(2). Retail pharmacists are currently limited in their reviews to 
diagnostic information gleaned from the patient and the prescription. 
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Improper prescribing not only puts the individual patient’s safety 
at risk, but also greatly increases the likelihood of misuse and abuse of 
prescription drugs. Between 1994 and 2004, the population of the 
United States grew 12%, while at the same time the number of pre-
scription drugs dispensed grew nearly 68%. The only thing that has 
outpaced this figure is the rate of abuse of those drugs, growing nearly 
80%. In fact, more Americans abuse prescription drugs than the num-
ber who abuse cocaine, heroin, hallucinogens, Ecstasy, and inhalants, 
combined. In fact, one out of five teenagers in America has abused, or 
is abusing, prescription drugs. Aside from our financial responsibility, 
we have a social responsibility to ensure that our public health care 
system isn’t used to further intensify and subsidize a public health 
crisis.157
Despite the fact that federal prosecutors often tout their off-label 
promotion enforcement efforts as furthering patient safety, federal 
FCA litigation does little to change physicians’ off-label prescribing 
habits.
 
158 Two significant initiatives are currently underway within the 
federal health care system to address the problem of improper pre-
scribing: the adoption of electronic health records, which include elec-
tronic prescriptions,159 and increased funding for comparative effec-
tiveness research and “evidence-based” medical practice.160
  
  157 Carper, supra note 10, at 2.  
  158 See Johnson, supra note 30, at 115-16 (“In 2002, 94% of Neurontin 
prescriptions were for off-label indications, up from 40% in 1995. Neurontin sales 
amounted to $2.7 billion in 2003, of which nearly $2.5 billion was for off-label 
uses….In August, 2004, two years into the state and federal governments’ pursuit of 
the lawsuit and shortly after the attention-grabbing settlement, sales of Neurontin had 
actually increased by 32% over the same quarter the year before. Lehman Brothers 
estimated that the great bulk of those prescriptions of Neurontin—90% of sales, in 
fact—were still for off-label uses.”). 
  159 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act provided financial 
incentives for health care providers to adopt electronic health records (EHR). See 
CMS Proposes Definition of Meaningful Use of Certified Electronic Health Records 
(EHR) Technology, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., (Dec. 30, 2009), 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/fact_sheets.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).  
 First, 
  160 See Nathaniel Wiexel, Obama Budget Plan Includes $286 Million In 
Funding for Medical Option Comparisons, 18 HEALTH CARE POL’Y REPORT 168 
(2010) (“President Obama’s fiscal year 2011 budget blueprint includes $286 million 
in the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) for research that com-
pares the effectiveness of different medical options. The funding for comparative 
effectiveness research (CER) would build on the expansion of this research begun 
under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, Pub. L. No. 111-5). 
According to budget documents, ‘the dissemination of this research is expected to 
lead to higher quality, evidence-based medicine, arming patients and physicians with 
the best available information to allow them to choose the medical option that will 
work the best for them.’”).  
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adoption of electronic health records makes inclusion of diagnosis on 
prescriptions easier for physicians because the diagnosis code neces-
sary for patient records and physician reimbursement can be easily 
transmitted with any electronic prescription generated from the EHR 
system.161 Second, robust data on on- vs. off-label use of drugs and 
devices has been elusive, at best, and will be critical for any serious 
efforts to drive evidence-based medical practice.162 Medicare Part D 
and Medicaid outpatient prescription data, if linked to patient diagno-
sis, could provide much of the data needed to link off-label use of 
prescription drugs to health outcomes in order to inform physicians’ 
prescribing habits and insurers’ evaluation of medical services.163
While the federal government and public opinion have put the 
blame for wrongful payment of outpatient prescription drug claims 
primarily on pharmaceutical companies’ off-label promotion, the re-
  
  
  In addition to the funds appropriated to the AHRQ, another $400 million 
went to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) with the goal of “improv[ing] health 
outcomes by providing evidence to enhance medical decisions made by patients and 
their medical providers.” DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF 
HEALTH: COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH 1, available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/recovery /reports/plans/nih_cer_plan.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 
2011). The NIH already recognizes that “[t]his research necessitates the development, 
expansion, and use of a variety of data sources and methods to assess comparative 
effectiveness.” Id. at 1. Thus, linking prescription information to diagnosis codes in a 
single database would help expand the current universe of data sources available for 
CER and allow for significantly more diverse patient populations than are currently 
observed in the majority of clinical studies. 
  161 See Corr, supra note 6, at 6-7 (“The development and implementation 
of Electronic Health Records (EHR) should also have a positive impact on reducing 
the error rate for Medicare [fee-for-service payments]. After EHRs are fully imple-
mented there will be fewer errors for illegible or missing signatures. Further, docu-
mentation errors are the most frequent reason for claim denials. The expectation is 
that the EHR will contain all the documentation to support the claim.”). 
  162 See generally Emily A. Largent et al., Going Off-label Without Ventur-
ing Off-Course: Evidence and Ethical Off-label Prescribing, 169 ARCH. INTERN. 
MED. 1745 (2009) (arguing that there should be more reflection and scrutiny of evi-
dence on behalf of physicians before prescribing off-label uses). 
  163 This data could be especially valuable given the current disparity be-
tween federal and private funding for post-marketing clinical trials and the concern 
that pharmaceutical company funds may improperly influence clinical researchers. 
See Johnson, supra note 30, at 85 (“In comparison to the approximately $950 million 
of federal money devoted to all phases of clinical trials, pharmaceutical firms may be 
spending as much as $8 to $12 billion on post-marketing trials alone.”); Harry P. 
Selker & Alastair J.J. Wood, Industry Influence on Comparative-Effectiveness Re-
searchFfunded through Health Care Reform, 361 N. ENGL. J. MED. 2595 (2009) 
(arguing that commercial and political interests may “taint” comparative effectiveness 
research). See generally Bernard Lo, Serving Two Masters—Conflicts of Interest in 
Academic Medicine, 362 N. ENGL. J. MED. 669 (2010) (discussing the divergence in 
interests between pharmaceutical companies and academic health centers). 
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sponsibility of properly administering Medicare and Medicaid bene-
fits falls also on those writing the checks for individual claims. The 
government has poured billions of dollars into targeted enforcement 
mechanisms and incentivized whistleblower actions to mobilize thou-
sands of professionals in the fight against health care fraud. Even so, 
at their best, these efforts merely scratch the surface of the problem. 
Instead of dedicating even more resources to enforcement, there needs 
to be more attention paid to fixing the system on the front end. One 
small step in that direction would be to make patient diagnosis codes a 
part of the Medicare Part D and Medicaid system for reimbursing 
claims for outpatient prescription drugs. 
